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VALUING LIFE: A PLEA FOR
DISAGGREGATION
CASS R. SUNSTEINt
ABSTRACT
Each government agency uses a uniform figure to measure the
value of a statistical life (VSL). This is a serious mistake. The very
theory that underlies current practice calls for far more individuation
of the relevant values. According to that theory, VSL should vary
across risks. More controversially, VSL should vary across
individuals-even or especially if the result would be to produce a
lower number for some people than for others. One practical
implication is that a higher value should be given to programs that
reduce cancer risks. Another is that government should use a higher
VSL for programs that disproportionately benefit the wealthy-and a
lower VSL for programs that disproportionately benefit the poor. But
there are two serious complications here. First, bounded rationality
raises problems for the use of private willingness to pay, which
underlies current calculations of VSL. Second, the beneficiaries of
regulation sometimes pay only a fraction or even none of its cost;
when this is so, the appropriate VSL for poor people might be higher,
on distributional grounds, than market evidence suggests. An
understanding of this point has implications for foundational issues
about government regulation, including valuation of persons in poor
and wealthy nations.
Copyright © 2004 by Cass R. Sunstein.
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INTRODUCTION
For over two decades, executive orders have required regulatory
agencies to engage in cost-benefit analysis of major regulations,' and
Congress has imposed similar requirements in several statutes.2 To
1. See STEPHEN BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY
120-35 (5th ed. 2002) (examining executive orders that require federal agencies to balance the
benefits of their decisions against the cost).
2. See, e.g., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136(bb)
(2000) (defining "unreasonable adverse effects on the environment" as "any unreasonable risk
to man or the environment, taking into account the economic, social, and environmental costs
and benefits of the use of any pesticides"); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2605(c)(1)
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conduct cost-benefit analysis, agencies must assign monetary values
to human lives that are potentially saved by a proposed regulation.
How do they come up with the numbers that they use? Do some
deaths count for more than others?
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) uses a uniform
value for a statistical life (VSL): $6.1 million? Other agencies use
numbers that are both higher and lower than the EPA's VSL, with a
range, in recent years, between $1.5 million (the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) in 1990') and the Food and Drug
Administration's (FDA's) current figure of $6.5 million. Although
substantial differences can be found across agencies,6 uniformity is the
intended practice within each agency.7 No agency treats cancer risks,
(2000) (mandating that the administrator consider and publish a statement documenting the
effects, benefits, and economic impacts of proposed toxic substance regulations); Safe Drinking
Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300g-l(b)(3)(c) (2000) (requiring the documentation of quantifiable and
nonquantifiable costs and benefits in the establishment of maximum contaminant levels).
3. National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Arsenic and Clarifications to
Compliance and New Source Contaminants Monitoring, 66 Fed. Reg. 6976, 7012 (Jan. 22, 2001)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 141, and 142). I refer throughout to uniform numbers, but this is of
course a simplification. There are differences across agencies, and within agencies practices are
variable over time and across regulations. By referring to a uniform number, I mean that
regulatory agencies do not distinguish among risks or among protected classes, so as to produce
the variations that I emphasize here. Within regulations, uniform numbers are used, and when
disparate numbers are used across regulations, it is not because of a judgment about different
risks or different protected classes.
In its July 2003 regulation governing food labeling of trans-fatty acids, the Food and
Drug Administration used a VSL of $6.5 million. Food Labeling: Trans Fatty Acids in Nutrition
Labeling, Nutrient Content Claims, and Health Claims, 68 Fed. Reg. 41,434, 41,489 (July 11,
2003) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101). In its March 2003 proposed rule on dietary ingredients and
dietary supplements, the same agency suggested a VSL of $5 million. See Current Good
Manufacturing Practice in Manufacturing, Packing, or Holding Dietary Ingredients and Dietary
Supplements, 68 Fed. Reg. 12,158,12,229 (proposed Mar. 13, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R.
pts. 111, 112) (using this value to calculate the "value of a statistical life day").
4. The Department of Transportation now uses a higher figure, but one that is still lower
than the VSL used by most agencies. See Brake System Safety Standards for Freight and Other
Non-Passenger Trains and Equipment; End-of-Train Devices, 67 Fed. Reg. 17,556, 17,560 (Apr.
10, 2002) (codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 232) (recording the Department of Transportation's VSL as
$2.7 million).
5. Infra Table 1; see Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit
Analysis When Preferences Are Distorted, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1105, 1146 (2000) (comparing the
"valuations of life" advanced by multiple agencies).
6. These differences seem inexplicable.
7. See Adler & Posner, supra note 5, at 1122-23 (explaining that an agency's use of "a
constant figure for the monetized value of life" is one means of correcting for wealth distortions
in individual preferences). There are some differences within agencies across contexts and
across time, but those differences do not seem deliberate. See supra note 3 (comparing VSLs
both within and across agencies). The most explicit discussions of varying VSLs have come from
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or other mortality risks that produce unusual fear or involve special
suffering, as worthy of more concern (and a higher valuation) than
other risks. No agency contends that distinctive values should be
assigned to the risks associated with airplane deaths, motor vehicle
deaths, or deaths from defective children's toys. No agency treats
young people as worth more than old people.8 No agency values the
lives of poor people less than the lives of rich people. No agency
distinguishes between whites and African Americans or between men
and women. For statistical lives, the governing idea is that each life is
the EPA. In its 2003 discussion of hazardous air pollutants, National Emission Standards for
Hazardous Air Pollutants for Industrial/Commercial/Institutional Boilers and Process Heaters,
68 Fed. Reg. 1660 (proposed Jan. 13, 2003) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63), the EPA noted:
There is general agreement that the value to an individual of a reduction in mortality
risk can vary based on several factors, including the age of the individual, the type of
risk, the level of control the individual has over the risk, the individual's attitude
toward risk, and the health status of the individual.
Id. at 1695. Nonetheless, the agency announced, without explanation, that it "prefers not to
draw distinctions in the monetary value assigned to the lives saved even if they differ in age,
health status, socioeconomic status, gender or other characteristic of the adult population." Id.
An extended discussion of related issues can be found in the EPA's arsenic proposal,
National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Arsenic and Clarifications to Compliance and
New Source Contaminants Monitoring, 65 Fed. Reg. 38,888 (proposed June 22, 2000) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 141, 142). In this proposal, the EPA noted that the
factors which may influence the estimate of economic benefits associated with
avoided cancer fatalities include (1) a possible 'cancer premium' (i.e., the additional
value or sum that people may be willing to pay to avoid the experiences of dread,
pain and suffering, and diminished quality of life associated with cancer-related illness
and ultimate fatality); (2) the willingness of people to pay more over time to avoid
mortality risk as their income rises; (3) a possible premium for accepting involuntary
risks as opposed to voluntary [sic] assumed risks; (4) the greater risk aversion of the
general population as compared to workers in the wage-risk valuation studies; (5)
'altruism' or the willingness of people to pay more to reduce risk in other sectors of
the population; and (6) a consideration of health status and life years remaining at the
time of premature mortality.
Id. at 38,945. The EPA acknowledged that these factors "may significantly increase the present
value estimate," but said that "there is currently neither a clear consensus among economists
about how to simultaneously analyze each of these adjustments nor is there adequate empirical
data to support definitive quantitative estimates for all potentially significant adjustment
factors." Id. Hence the EPA solicited comments on these issues and said that it would ask its
Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) to conduct a review. Id. As noted below, the comments
produced a sensitivity analysis that contains several upward adjustments from the $6.1 million
figure, see infra note 100 and accompanying text, but the SAB's review suggested that at the
present time, upward adjustments were not justified by existing evidence, see infra note 141 and
accompanying text.
8. With the interest in focusing on "life-years," however, this might change. See Cass R.
Sunstein, Lives, Life-Years, and Willingness to Pay, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 205, 206 (2004)
("[G]overnment should consider not simply. .. the VSL; it should concern itself also or instead
with the number of life-years at stake, or the value of statistical life-years (VSLY). At the very
least, the number of statistical life-years is a more precise measure of what is involved.").
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worth exactly the same. With respect to cost-benefit analysis, much is
disputed.9 But on the idea of a uniform value per life saved, there is a
solid consensus, at least in terms of regulatory practice.'0
The stakes are exceedingly high. If cost-benefit analysis is the
basis for the ultimate decision to approve or reject a proposed
regulation, everything turns on the selected VSL. If an agency uses a
VSL of, say, $15 million, many more regulations will be justified than
if it uses a VSL of, say, $2 million. And if a uniform number is
rejected, the pattern of justified regulations will shift dramatically.
Some existing regulations will be revealed as too weak, and more
stringency will be required; others will seem too aggressive and will
have to be weakened or even eliminated. If agencies shifted to using
VSLs that varied along one or more variables, the regulatory system
would look very different from how it does today.
In this Article, I intend to question the consensus in favor of a
uniform VSL, and to do so in a way that raises foundational issues
about the economic valuation of human lives. I suggest that a uniform
value is obtuse. Under the very approach that agencies use to produce
the current numbers, VSL should vary along two dimensions. VSL is
calculated based on people's willingness to pay (WTP) to avoid
particular risks, and if WTP is particularly high, VSL will be high as
well. For two reasons, VSL should be expected to be highly variable,
in a way that makes a uniform number senseless.
9. See generally FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING
THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004) (attacking the very practice
of assigning dollar values to lives and health as part of cost-benefit analysis); W. KIP VISCUSI,
FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK (1992) (suggesting that
the government should "respect citizens' preferences" in assigning valuation and thus should
consider subjective valuation in cost-benefit analysis, even when such valuation is irrational);
Adler & Posner, supra note 5, at 1106 ("The problem with the traditional definition of [cost-
benefit analysis] in terms of actual preferences is that satisfaction of actual preference and
maximization of well-being are not equivalent.... Cost-benefit analysis can be redefined as the
sum of welfare equivalents....").
10. An arguable exception, noted above, involves the debate over whether agencies should
focus on lives or instead life-years; the latter approach might well value older people less than
younger ones. For discussion, see Sunstein, supra note 8, at 205. Professor W. Kip Viscusi
implicitly challenges the consensus, stating: "The current approach of ignoring length-of-life
issues creates inequities by valuing the life of a person with . . . a 6-month life expectancy the
same as a ... person with a 40-year life expectancy." W. Kip Viscusi, Risk Equity, 29 J. LEGAL
STUD. 843, 870 (2000). W. Kip Viscusi and Joseph E. Aldy note the existence of heterogeneity
by income, union status, and age, and they explain that the "existence of such heterogeneity
provides a cautionary note for policy." W. Kip Viscusi & Joseph E. Aldy, The Value of a
Statistical Life: A Critical Review of Market Estimates Throughout the World, 27 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 5,7 (2003).
2004]
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First, VSL should vary across risks. For example, people are
willing to pay high amounts to avoid cancer risks, and hence there is
reason to think that people's VSL is higher for cancer deaths than for
sudden, unanticipated deaths." Cancer risks are involved in the work
of many regulatory agencies, and people seem to be particularly
concerned about such risks, in a way that should produce a high
VSL-almost unquestionably higher than the values that agencies
now use. More generally, deaths that produce unusual fear,'2 or that
are accompanied by high levels of pain and suffering, should be
expected to produce a higher VSL. Human beings face countless
mortality risks, and it would be truly bizarre to maintain that people
value avoiding each of those risks identically.
Second, VSL should vary across individuals, simply because
different people are willing to pay different amounts to avoid risks.
People who are risk averse will be willing to pay more, and will
therefore show a higher VSL, than people who are risk-seeking.'"
Those who are rich will show a higher VSL than those who are poor.
People who are thirty might well show a higher VSL than people who
are sixty." It follows that different demographic groups will show
diversity in their VSLs as well.'6
11. See James K. Hammitt & Jin-Tan Liu, Effects of Disease Type and Latency on the Value
of Mortality Risk, 28 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 73, 80 (2004) ("The value of preventing a fatal
cancer is often considered to be greater than the value of preventing a fatal trauma in a
workplace or transportation accident.").
12. For evidence of a higher VSL for airline risks than for automotive risks, see Fredrik
Carlsson et al., Is Transport Safety More Valuable in the Air?, 28 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 147,
148 (2004) ("There are several reasons why individuals would be willing to pay more for the
same risk reduction when traveling by air compared to by other transport modes, such as car or
train.").
13. See Viscusi & Aldy, supra note 10, at 18 ("[T]ransferring the estimates of a value of a
statistical life to non-labor market contexts, as is the case in benefit-cost analyses of
environmental health policies for example, should recognize that different populations have
different preferences over risks and different values on life-saving.").
14. See Carlsson et al., supra note 12, at 158 (finding that people who are scared of flying
are willing to pay especially high amounts to reduce the risks associated with flying).
15. See JOSEPH E. ALDY & W. KIP VISCUSI, AGE VARIATIONS IN WORKERS' VALUE OF
STATISTICAL LIFE I (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10199,2003) ("[Olne
might expect that older individuals may value reducing risks to their lives less because they have
shorter remaining life expectancy.").
16. Such differences are found in W. Kip Viscusi, Racial Differences in Labor Market
Values of a Statistical Life, 27 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 239, 252 tbl.5 (2003). To get a bit ahead
of the story: I am not arguing that government should assign a higher VSL to white lives than to
African-American lives. I am speaking here of demographic differences that would emerge
from a fully individuated approach to VSL, in which each person's WTP was calculated on an
individual basis. Once these values are aggregated, the white VSL would likely be higher than
[Vol. 54:385
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If these two forms of variability-across risks and across
persons-are put together, it will be clear that the unitary $6.1 million
figure used by the EPA is far too crude." Each person in society is
willing to pay a distinctive amount to avoid each risk. It follows that
in theory, each person should have a particular VSL for each and
every risk, resulting in a fully individuated VSL. s Such a fully
individuated VSL would mean, for example, that agencies would
value avoidance of cancer risks more highly than many other
mortality risks-and that the VSL of some racial groups would likely
be lower than that of others.19 But the latter differences would not be
the result of a governmental decision to take racial characteristics into
account; in fact it would not be a product of any kind of group-level
discrimination on the government's part.0 The differences would be
the result of aggregating the VSLs calculated for each individual.
the African-American VSL, simply because of disparities in wealth and income. Richer people
pay more for safe cars and smoke alarms than poor people do. See infra text accompanying
notes 17-21.
17. I use the EPA's $6.1 million VSL throughout as a convenient example of a unitary
figure, but the analysis applies equally to any agency's unitary figure, and to uniformity across
agencies.
18. I am putting to one side the complication that values sometimes are constructed, rather
than elicited, by social situations-an especially serious complication for contingent valuation
studies. See John W. Payne et al., Measuring Constructed Preferences: Toward a Building Code,
19 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 243, 244 (1999) (addressing the "alternate viewpoint ... that
preferences are generally constructed-not revealed-at the time a valuation question is
asked"); Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron,
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1177-78 (2003) ("[I]n the contexts in which [contingent valuation]
studies are used,... it is unclear that people have straightforward 'values' that can actually be
found. Hence some form of paternalism verges on the inevitable: Stated values will often be
affected.., by how the questions are set up." (footnote omitted)).
19. See John D. Leeth & John Ruser, Compensating Wage Differentials for Fatal and
Nonfatal Injury Risk by Gender and Race, 27 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 257, 270 (2003) (finding
that the implied VSL for Hispanic males is $5.0 million overall and $4.2 million for blue-collar
workers, whereas the implied VSL for white males is $3.4 million overall and $4.2 million for
blue-collar workers); Viscusi, supra note 16, at 252 (finding VSLs of $15 million for whites and
$7.2 million for African Americans, $18.8 million for white males and $9.4 million for white
females, and $6.9 million for African-American females and $5.9 million for African-American
males).
20. Discrimination might well lay in the background, of course; it almost certainly accounts
for the unequal opportunities that produce lower VSLs for African Americans than for whites.
See Viscusi, supra note 16, at 255. Professor Viscusi goes on to suggest that "it is inappropriate
to attribute the observed differences to a greater willingness by black workers to bear risk." Id.
In a sense Professor Viscusi is correct; there is no reason to think that African-American
workers have an intrinsically greater predisposition to take risks. But in the market, one's
willingness to bear risks is a product of "market opportunities," and hence those with fewer
opportunities will show a greater willingness to bear risk.
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Such aggregation occurs today in, for example, ordinary consumer
markets that price reduction of the statistical risks associated with
smoke alarms, unusually safe cars, and much more.2
In practice, of course, a fully individuated VSL is not feasible, for
two different reasons. First, government lacks the information that
would permit the calculation. Regulators do not know how much
each person would be willing to pay to reduce each statistical risk;
generalizations through the use of categories are therefore inevitable.
Second, many regulatory programs involve collective goods and
protect many people at once. A clean air program, for example,
cannot easily ensure that some people in a geographical region are
exposed to no more than 10 parts per billion (ppb) of some pollutant,
while others in the same region are subjected to 50 ppb. Because
collective goods are typically involved in regulation, the problem is
pervasive. When government is providing a regulatory good to many
people at once, feasibility requires that it use a single VSL, not a
range of VSLs.
Notwithstanding issues of feasibility, an understanding of the
reasons for individuating VSL is important for two reasons. The first
involves conceptual clarity. The theory behind the use of VSL and
WTP remains poorly understood. In brief, VSL, as currently
understood, is a product of agency judgments about people's WTP to
reduce or eliminate certain risks. When a particular VSL is used (say,
$6 million), it is because the agency estimates that people are willing
to pay a certain amount to reduce statistical risks of a specified
magnitude. This point should be enough to show that whatever
terminology agencies use, there is no "value of a statistical life"; there
are only values for the reduction of statistical risks." Once regulators
identify the real question as the identification of those values, they
will find it difficult to defend a unitary VSL, simply because there is
no such thing. An appreciation of the case for individuation will
clarify the theory-both its rationale and its limitations, empirical and
ethical. I emphasize that the theory is undergirded by considerations
21. See VISCUSI, supra note 9, at 31-32 (discussing the value of life issue in economic
terms).
22. See, e.g., National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for
Industrial/Commercial/Institutional Boilers and Process Heaters, 68 Fed. Reg. 1660, 1695
(proposed Jan. 13, 2003) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63) (noting that the value of a statistical
life is "the value to an individual of a reduction in mortality risk").
[Vol. 54:385
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of both autonomy and welfare-and that those considerations also
show when the use of WTP to calculate VSL is misguided.
The second reason involves the possibility of moving a long way
toward greater individuation, even if full individuation is not feasible.
With respect to the reduction of cancer risks, for example, there is
reason to believe that people are willing to pay an extra amount;
hence VSL, based on WTP, is significantly higher than studies of risks
not involving cancer suggest." For this reason, the government's
current valuation of cancer risks is probably too low, resulting in
widespread underprotection of the public. Similarly, there is reason to
think that VSL should be higher for mortality risks from airplanes
than for statistically identical risks on the highways. 2' More generally,
different agencies, dealing with qualitatively different risks, might
well use different VSLs, simply because market evidence is likely to
show just those differences.25 Full individuation is not feasible, but
greater individuation would be quite easy. The result would be
different judgments from agencies, simply because new VSLs-some
higher, others lower-would produce different conclusions about
when regulation is justified.
A far more troublesome problem, to which I will devote
considerable attention, involves disparities along demographic lines.
For now, notice a simple factual point: WTP is dependent on ability
to pay, and those with little income and wealth will show little WTP.
26
It follows that the VSL of poor people, when calculated based on
WTP, will be lower than the VSL of rich people, simply because poor
people are poorer. Suppose that the $6.1 million figure used by the
EPA represents the average WTP of a population-wide sample.
When risks are faced disproportionately by wealthy people, VSL,
23. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
24. See Carlsson, supra note 12, at 148 (finding that individuals' VTP to reduce the risk of
airline deaths is more than double their WTP to reduce the risk of taxi deaths).
25. As I explain in Part I.A, different agencies now use different numbers for VSL, but
these differences seem random and do not stem from a careful inquiry into the questions that I
am emphasizing here.
26. If the tax laws ensured the right level of redistribution, there would be little reason to
use regulatory policy to promote redistributive goals. Regulation would be based on WTP, and
tax laws would ensure such redistribution. Hence the analysis of VSL and WTP would be
different with an optimal tax policy from what it must be without such a policy. If tax policy
were optimal, a highly variable WTP would be appropriate and there would be no need to take
account of distributional concerns. The discussion below is based on the assumption that more
redistribution is desirable and that regulatory policy can sometimes help to promote that goal,
though less effectively than an optimal tax.
2004]
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based on actual WTP, should be higher than $6.1 million-just as it
should be lower when the regulated risks are faced disproportionately
by poor people." It is inevitable that people in poor nations will have
a lower VSL than people in rich nations, a point with implications for
valuation of the harms from global warming." Similarly, people in
poor areas will have a lower VSL than those in wealthy areas, a point
with implications for valuation of a variety of risks in the domestic
setting. If variations across risks and persons are significant, the
question of individuation should be a central part of the second
generation of cost-benefit analysis-a step beyond the first-
generation debate about whether to do such analysis at all, and a step
toward doing such analysis in a way that is more refined and more
closely attuned to the consequences of regulations in terms of choice,
welfare, and distributional equity.
Of course it is offensive and wrong to suggest that in principle,
poor people are "worth less" than rich people. If poor people are
subject to a risk of 1/10,000, they do not have less of a claim to public
attention than wealthy people who are subject to the same risk; in fact
they may have a greater claim, if only because they lack the resources
to reduce that risk on their own. But the topic here is regulation
rather than subsidy, and the two ought not to be confused. In
principle, government should not force people to buy protection
against statistical risks at a price that seems excessive to them.29 At
least as a general rule, people should not be required to pay $70 to
reduce a risk of 1/100,000 if they are willing to pay no more than $50.
If a uniform VSL would benefit the poor, there is a strong
argument for a uniform VSL. But regulation based on a uniform VSL
may or may not produce a more equitable distribution of income; in
fact any redistribution may be perverse, and a single VSL might not
promote equality at all.' ° And if poor people are forced to pay an
amount for risk reduction that exceeds their WTP, desirable
redistribution will hardly result; forced exchanges, on terms that
people would voluntarily reject, are not a good way of redistributing
27. With this qualification: If poor people would be disproportionately benefited by
assigning them a higher VSL, then there is a good argument for assigning them a higher VSL. I
explore this issue in Part III.B.
28. See infra Part IV.
29. I offer a number of qualifications below. See infra Part III.B.
30. If wealthy people are the principal beneficiaries of a particular regulation chosen on the
basis of a uniform VSL, and if the public as a whole pays for it, then any redistribution will
benefit the wealthy, not the poor.
[Vol. 54:385
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wealth to the disadvantaged. (Requiring poor people to buy Volvos is
not the most sensible means of assisting them.) On the other hand, it
is possible that some regulatory programs, based on a uniform VSL,
will help those in need, if their beneficiaries receive risk reduction for
which they pay little or nothing-an issue to which I will devote
considerable attention.
A larger lesson follows from this discussion. For purposes of law
and politics, there is no sensible answer to the abstract question about
the correct monetary value of human life. Any judgment about the
appropriate VSL, and about individuation, must be heavily
pragmatic; it must rest on the consequences of one or another choice.
Whether government should use a higher or lower VSL across
demographic lines cannot be answered simply. An important
implication involves the assessment of VSL across nations. A poor
nation would do well to adopt a lower VSL than a wealthy nation; for
China or India, it would be disastrous to use a VSL equivalent to that
of the United States or Canada. But this point should not be taken to
support the ludicrous proposition that donor institutions, both public
and private, should value risk reduction in a wealthy nation above
equivalent risk reduction in a poor nation.
This Article is organized as follows. Part I clarifies the theory
behind the valuation of statistical lives. The major point is that
regulators do not really use a VSL; instead they use a mean WTP to
eliminate a statistical risk. For example, agencies might say that they
are using a VSL of $6 million, but when they do so, they are relying on
evidence more or less establishing that the average person is paid
$600 to face a risk of 1/10,000. The case for using this evidence
depends on considerations of both autonomy and welfare. Part II, in
some ways the heart of the Article, explores the need for
individuation across both risks and persons. Part III offers a more
ambitious discussion of the uses and limits of WTP in regulatory
policy. It distinguishes between easy and hard cases for using WTP to
calculate VSL. The central claim in Part III is that the argument for
using WTP is strongest when the beneficiaries of regulation must pay
all of its cost-though even in that event, the argument is subject to
important qualifications, above all involving bounded rationality. The
argument for using WTP is weaker when the beneficiaries of
regulation pay only a fraction of that cost. When this is so, some
people will benefit from regulation even if it is inefficient in economic
terms. I discuss the implications of this point for a uniform or fully
individuated VSL. Part IV turns to global regulation and the question
20041
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of cross-national differences in VSL. My conclusion is that while third-
party donors should help those people who need help most, without
reference to lower VSLs in poor countries, governments in wealthy
nations should use a higher VSL than governments in poor ones.
I. WTP: THEORY AND PRACTICE
I begin with an explanation of existing agency practice in
calculating VSL and of the theory that underlies it. As discussed
below, agencies calculate VSL on the basis of market evidence of
WTP. Agencies are not really able to identify a "value of a statistical
life"; instead they take advantage of information about how much
people are willing to pay for facing statistical risks. I suggest that
considerations of both welfare and autonomy make it reasonable for
agencies to consult WTP. Unfortunately, many questions might be
raised about the numbers that agencies now use.
A. Agency Practice
It has now become standard for regulatory agencies to assign
monetary values to human lives. Consider the following table, which
captures several examples of agency practices from 1996 through 2003:
TABLE 1: AGENCY VALUES OF LIFE, 1996-2003
Agency Regulation and Date VSL (in US$)
Department of Safety Requirements for Operators of 3 million
Transportation/Federal Small Passenger-Carrying Commercial
Motor Carrier Safety Motor Vehicles Used in Interstate
Administration Commerce (Aug. 12, 2003)31
Department of Health Food Labeling: Trans Fatty Acids in 6.5 million
& Human Services/FDA Nutrition Labeling, Nutrient Content
Claims, and Health Claims (July 11, 2003)32
Department of Control of Listeria Monocytogenes in 4.8 million
Agriculture/Food Safety Ready-to-Eat Meat and Poultry Products
and Inspection Service (June 6, 2003)33
Department of Health Labeling Requirements for Systemic 5 million
& Human Services/FDA Antibacterial Drug Products Intended for
Human Use (Feb. 6, 2003) 34  _7 :_
31. 68 Fed. Reg. 47,860, 47,869 (Aug. 12, 2003) (codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 390, 398).
32. 68 Fed. Reg. 41,434, 41,490 (July 11, 2003) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101).
33. 68 Fed. Reg. 34,208, 34,222 (June 6, 2003) (codified at 9 C.F.R. pt. 430).
34. 68 Fed. Reg. 6062, 6076 (Feb. 6, 2003) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 201).
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Office of Management Draft 2003 Report to Congress on the 5 million
and Budget Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations
(Feb. 3, 2003)
31
EPA Control of Emissions from Nonroad Large 6 million
Spark-Ignition Engines, and Recreational
Engines (Marine and Land-Based) (Nov. 8,
2002)"
EPA National Primary Drinking Water 6.1 million
Regulations; Arsenic and Clarifications to
Compliance and New Source Contaminants
Monitoring (Jan. 22, 2001)"
EPA Control of Air Pollution from New Motor 6 million
Vehicles: Heavy-Duty Engine and Vehicle
Standards and Highway Diesel Fuel Sulfur
Control Requirements (Jan. 18, 2001)38
EPA Control of Air Pollution from New Motor 5.9 million
Vehicles: Tier 2 Motor Vehicle Emissions
Standards and Gasoline Sulfur Control
Requirements (Feb. 10, 2000)"
EPA Findings of Significant Contribution and 5.9 million
Rulemaking on Section 126 Petitions for
Purposes of Reducing Interstate Ozone
Transport (Jan. 18, 2000)40
EPA Final Standards for Hazardous Air 5.6 million
Pollutants for Hazardous Waste
Combustors (Sept. 30, 1999)4
EPA National Primary Drinking Water 5.6 million
Regulations: Disinfectants and Disinfection
Byproducts (Dec. 16, 1998)'
35. 68 Fed. Reg. 5492, 5500 (proposed Feb. 3, 2003).
36. 67 Fed. Reg. 68,242, 68,327 (Nov. 8, 2002) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 89-91, 94, 1048,
1051, 1065, and 1068).
37. 66 Fed. Reg. 6976, 7012 (Jan. 22, 2001) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 141, and 142).
38. 66 Fed. Reg. 5002, 5103 (Jan. 18, 2001) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 69 and 80).
39. 65 Fed. Reg. 6698, 6784 (Feb. 10, 2000) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 80, 85, and 86).
40. 65 Fed. Reg. 2674, 2721 (Jan. 18, 2000) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 52, 97).
41. 64 Fed. Reg. 52,828, 53,020 (Sept. 30, 1999) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, et al.).
42. 63 Fed. Reg. 69,390, 69,440-41 (Dec. 16, 1998) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 141 and 142).
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Department of Financial Responsibility Requirements for 3 million
Transportation/FAA Licensed Launch Activities (Aug. 26,
1998)0"
Department of Health Quality Mammography Standards (Oct. 28, 5 million
& Human Services/FDA 1997) 44
Department of Health Regulations Restricting the Sale and 2.5 million
& Human Services/FDA Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless
Tobacco to Protect Children and
Adolescents (Aug. 28, 1996)
41
Department of Pathogen Reduction; Hazard Analysis and 1.6 million
Agriculture/Food Safety Critical Control Point (HACCP) Systems
and Inspection Service (July 25, 1996)46
Department of Aircraft Flight Simulator Use in Pilot 2.7 million
Transportation/FAA Training, Testing and Checking and at
Training Centers (July 2, 1996)
47
Consumer Product Requirements for Labeling of Retail 5 million
Safety Commission Containers of Charcoal (May 3, 1996)
48
Consumer Product Large Multiple-Tube Fireworks Devices 4.5-8 million
Safety Commission (May 3, 1996)49
These numbers show substantial variations, though less so than
even ten years ago.' The variations appear not to have any rationale
behind them; agencies with higher or lower numbers have not
explained their choices (and this is a significant problem). But the
most fundamental question is how agencies generate monetary
amounts of this kind. Agencies rely on two kinds of evidence. The
first and most important involves real-world markets, producing
43. 63 Fed. Reg. 45,592, 45,604 (Aug. 26, 1998) (codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 440).
44. 62 Fed. Reg. 55,852, 55,964 (Oct. 28, 1997) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 16, 900).
45. 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,576 (Aug. 28, 1996) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 803, 807,
and 820).
46. 61 Fed. Reg. 38,806, 38,958 (July 25, 1996) (codified at 9 C.F.R. pts. 310, 327, 381, 416,
and 417).
47. 61 Fed. Reg. 34,508, 34,546 (July 2, 1996) (codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 1).
48. 61 Fed. Reg. 19,818, 19,825 (May 3, 1996) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 1500).
49. 61 Fed. Reg. 13,084, 13,094 (Mar. 26, 1996) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pts. 1500, 1507).
50. See Adler & Posner, supra note 5, at 1146 (showing an ever larger disparity in VSL
numbers used by agencies between 1988 and 1997).
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evidence of compensation levels for actual risks.5 In the workplace
and in the market for consumer goods, additional safety has a price;
market evidence is investigated to identify that price. 2 The second
kind of evidence comes from contingent valuation studies, which ask
people how much they are willing to pay to reduce statistical risks.3
The EPA's $6.1 million figure, for example, is a product of studies of
actual workplace risks; such studies attempt to determine how much
workers are paid to assume mortality hazards. 4 The relevant risks
usually are in the general range of 1/10,000 to 1/100,000."5 The
calculation of VSL is a product of simple arithmetic. Suppose that
workers must be paid $600, on average, to assume a risk of 1/10,000.
If so, the VSL would be said to be $6 million.
For some of the two dozen labor market studies on which
agencies currently rely,56 consider the following table:57
TABLE 2: LABOR MARKET STUDIES ON THE VALUE OF LIFE
Study VSL (in US$)
Kniesner and Leith (1991) .7 million
Smith and Gilbert (1984) .8 million
Dillingham (1985) 1.1 million
Marin and Psacharopoulos (1982) 3.4 million
V.K. Smith (1976) 5.7 million
Viscusi (1981) 7.9 million
Leigh and Folsom (1984) 11.7 million
Leigh (1987) 12.6 million
Garen (1988) 16.3 million
51. See ViSCUSI, supra note 9, at 35 (explaining how labor markets compensate workers for
taking on risk).
52. See generally Viscusi & Aldy, supra note 10 (providing a valuable and comprehensive
overview of how market evidence is used to set prices).
53. See, e.g., Hammitt & Liu, supra note 11, at 74 (using contingent valuation in a study of
WTP in the context of cancer and other degenerative diseases).
54. Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, 90 GEO. L.J. 2255, 2274 (2002); VISCUSI,
supra note 9 (discussing WTP studies and how agencies use them to calculate VSL).
55. See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Life: Estimates with Risks by Occupation and
Industry, 42 ECON. INQUIRY 29, 33 (2004) (showing fatality risks ranging from about 1/100,000
to 45/100,000).
56. See Richard W. Parker, Grading the Government, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1345, 1485-86
(2003) (providing an accessible outline of labor market studies).
57. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING ECONOMIC ANALYSES 89
(2000).
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A large advantage of labor market studies of this kind is that
they avoid the lively disputes over the use of "willingness to pay" or
"willingness to accept" (WTA) in regulatory policy.58 In many
contexts, in both experiments and the real world, people demand
more to give up a good than they are willing to pay to obtain it in the
first instance-a disparity that significantly complicates efforts to
assign monetary values to regulatory benefits, including mortality and
morbidity. 9 If people are willing to pay $25 to eliminate an existing
risk of 1/100,000, but demand $100 to incur a new risk of 1/100,000,
then it is difficult to know how to proceed for purposes of monetary
valuation of risks. Should agencies use $25, $100, or some
intermediate figure? Fortunately, this problem dissipates in the
context of labor market studies. If workers who face a risk of 1/10,000
are paid $600 more for doing so, and if workers who refuse to face
such a risk are paid $600 less, then it is irrelevant whether agencies
speak in terms of WTP or WTA.
B. Of Welfare and Autonomy
Why do regulators care about market valuations of statistical
risks? There are two possible answers. The first and more
conventional involves welfare. The second and perhaps more
interesting involves autonomy.
In economic terms, these valuations provide a clue to the welfare
consequences, for individuals, of one or another outcome. If people
are willing to pay $60, but no more, to eliminate a risk of 1/100,000,
then it can be reasonably assumed that their welfare is increased by
asking them to pay that amount-and that their welfare is decreased
by asking them to pay more. There are many demands on people's
budgets, and if they prefer not to spend more than $60 to eliminate a
risk of 1/100,000, it may be because they would like to use their
money for food, shelter, recreation, education, or any number of
other goods. With respect to mortality risks, it is possible that people
58. See generally Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 Nw. U.
L. REv. 1227 (2003) (explaining the so-called "endowment effect," by which individuals often
demand more to relinquish an item (WITA) than they would pay to obtain that same item
(WTP)).
59. See id. at 1228 ("[P]eople will often demand a higher price to sell a good that they
possess than they would pay for the same good if they did not possess it at present." (footnote
omitted)); Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, Environmental Law, 22 J. LEGAL STUD.
217, 226-27 (1993) ("The range of the disparity appears to vary from slight amounts to a ratio of
more than four to one, with WTA usually doubling WTP.").
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are sometimes inadequately informed, and there might be reason to
override their judgments. But so long as information is available, the
welfare argument is straightforward. 6°
Perhaps regulatory policy should not be based on welfare;
perhaps it is unclear what "welfare" really means, and WTP might be
defended instead on the ground of personal autonomy.6 On this view,
people should be sovereign over their own lives, and government
should respect personal choices about how to use limited resources
(again so long as those choices are informed). When people decline to
devote more than $60 to the elimination of a 1/100,000 risk, it is
because they would prefer to spend the money in a way that seems to
them more desirable. If regulators do not use people's actual
judgments, then they are insulting their dignity. The use of WTP
therefore can claim a simultaneous defense from both utilitarian and
deontological accounts.
C. Questions and Doubts
Nonetheless, some questions might be raised about the use of the
relevant studies by the EPA and other agencies. 62 Most obviously, the
studies show significant variety in the crucial numbers, ranging from
$16.3 million in 1988 to $.7 million in 1991. The EPA has adopted the
$6.1 million figure on the ground that it represents the median in the
relevant studies. 63 But there is a risk of arbitrariness in fastening on
that median figure, particularly if there is no reason to believe that
the relevant study is the most accurate. In fact a more general look at
the VSL data produces further puzzles and wider ranges. Some
studies find no compensating differentials at all, indicating a VSL of
zero 64-implausibly low, to say the least, for purposes of policy.
Others find that nonunionized workers receive negative compensating
differentials for risk-that is, they appear to be paid less because they
60. I deal with some complexities in Part III.
61. See RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
EQUALITY 122 (2000) (arguing that liberty "is essential to any process in which equality is
defined and secured").
62. For several such questions, see Robert H. Frank & Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit
Analysis and Relative Position, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 323, 323-28 (2001), and Parker, supra note
56, at 1348-57.
63. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
64. See Peter Dorman & Paul Hagstrom, Wage Compensation for Dangerous Work
Revisited, 52 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 116, 133 (1998) (finding "statistically significant positive
compensation" for only a few categories of workers).
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face mortality risks.65 Another study finds that African Americans
receive no significant compensating wage differential and hence that
their particular VSL is zero.6 On the other hand, some studies find
VSLs actually above the VSLs presented in Table 1; consider the
finding that for people who choose jobs with low level risks, the VSL
is as much as $22 million. 7
The most recent metastudy, far more comprehensive than the
EPA's own analysis, finds that most studies produce VSLs ranging
from $3.8 million to $9 million.' The range is fairly compressed, in a
way that disciplines agency decisions; for many regulations, the
"bottom line" of the cost-benefit assessment will not be affected by a
choice of $3.8 million or $9 million. But that range still leaves
significant room for discretion, in a way that would have significant
implications for policy and law. Consider the fact that the monetized
value of a program that saves two hundred lives would range from
$760 million to $1.8 billion; note also that the EPA's highly publicized
arsenic regulation would easily fail cost-benefit analysis with a $3.8
million VSL but easily pass with a $9 million VSL.69 The simple point
is that the variety of the outcomes raises questions about the
reliability of any particular figure.
In addition, most of the studies on which the EPA relies are
based on data from the 1970s.70 Since that time, there has been
significant growth in national income." This change suggests that any
VSL derived from 1970s data is too low. Of course people with more
money are expected to be willing to pay more, other things being
equal, to reduce statistical risks. One study finds that at the beginning
of the twentieth century, VSL was about $150,000 in current dollars-
less than one-twentieth of the corresponding amount a century later."
On reasonable assumptions, the EPA's use of 1970s data has
65. Viscusi & Aldy, supra note 10, at 44.
66. Leeth & Ruser, supra note 19, at 270.
67. Viscusi & Aldy, supra note 10, at 23.
68. Id. at 18.
69. See Sunstein, supra note 54, at 2274-76 (discussing the EPA's use of a $6.1 million VSL
in evaluating the arsenic regulation). The regulation was projected to cost about $200 million,
and its monetized benefits, with a $6.1 million VSL, were around $190 million. Id. at 2275. It
should be easy to see that a $3.8 million VSL would make the regulation impossible to defend-
and a $9 million VSL would make it impossible to challenge.
70. Id. at 2274.
71. Id. at 2284-85.
72. Viscusi & Aldy, supra note 10, at 22.
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produced a significant undervaluation of the monetary value of the
lives at stake; the $6.1 million figure reflects no adjustment to account
for changes in national real income growth.73 In principle, the failure
to undertake an adjustment is a serious mistake. The actual mean
WTP might be substantially higher.74
Even more fundamentally, the relevant numbers deserve respect
only if they do not result from bounded rationality or an absence of
information on the part of the people whose choices generate them.
Suppose, for example, that workers do not know the risks that they
face or that their decisions are products of the availability heuristic or
optimistic bias.7" In either case, regulators should not use, for
purposes of policy, a finding that workers are paid $60 to run a risk of
1/100,000; by hypothesis, that number does not reflect a rational
tradeoff by informed workers. I return to these points below.76
Current practice is based on an assumption, not that all or even most
workers make informed choices, but that market processes ensure the
right "price" for various degrees of safety.77 Compare pricing for soap,
cereals, and telephones: most consumers do not have full information
and use heuristics that lead them astray, but market competition
produces a sensible structure of prices, at least most of the time.
73. The EPA has updated the relevant numbers for inflation, but it has not otherwise made
adjustments. Sunstein, supra note 54, at 2284.
74. See Dora L. Costa & Matthew E. Kahn, The Rising Price of Nonmarket Goods, 93 AM.
ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 227, 229 tbl.1 (2003) (suggesting a likely current value of $12
million); Viscusi, supra note 16, at 252 tbl.5 (finding values as high as $15.1 million for white
males). In the context of arsenic regulation, the EPA also noted in its sensitivity analysis that
the appropriate adjustment would increase the VSL from $6.1 million to $6.7 million. National
Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Arsenic and Clarifications to Compliance and New
Source Contaminants Monitoring, 66 Fed. Reg. 6976, 7012 (Jan. 22, 2001) (codified at 40 C.F.R.
pts. 9, 141, and 142). Recent evidence suggests that the current VSL is $4.7 million for the entire
population, $7 million for blue-collar males, and $8.5 million for blue-collar females. Viscusi,
supra note 55, at 39.
75. The availability heuristic suggests that people will overestimate risks when an event is
readily "available" to people's minds, and underestimate risks when no such event is available.
Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV.
683, 685 (1999). Optimistic bias suggests that people will be excessively optimistic about risks
that they themselves face. Cass R. Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 772
(2003).
76. See infra Part III.A.2.
77. See VISCUSI, supra note 9.
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D. The Value of Statistical Risks, Not the Value of Statistical Lives
Suppose that the relevant problems can be solved and that
regulators can identify a number, call it $6 million, that really
represents people's valuations. It should be clear that even if this
were so, it would be grossly misleading to offer the following
suggestion: The value of a statistical life is $6 million. It would be
much more accurate to say that for risks of 1/10,000, the median WTP
in the relevant population is $600-or that for risks of 1/100,000, the
median WTP is $60. If true, these statements would, on assumptions
later explored, be extremely helpful for purposes of policy. But even
at first glance, it is clear that these numbers need not be taken to
support a VSL that is independent of probability."8 Suppose that
people would be willing to pay $60 to reduce a risk of 1/100,000. From
this it does not automatically follow that people would be willing to
pay $6 to eliminate a risk of 1/1,000,000, or $6,000 to reduce a risk of
1/1,000, or $60,000 to reduce a risk of 1/100. It is plausible to think
that people's WTP to reduce statistical risks is nonlinear. 9 As the
probability approaches 100 percent, people become willing to pay an
amount for risk reduction that rises nonlinearly to 100 percent of
their wealth; as the risk approaches zero, WTP nonlinearly
approaches nothing. For a risk of 1/1,000,000, for example, many
reasonable people would be unwilling to pay anything, treating that
risk as inconsequential.
Hence the claim that VSL is $6 million is merely a shorthand way
of saying that people are willing to pay from $600 to $60 to eliminate
risks of 1/10,000 to 1/100,000. Because this is the range for risks with
which most agencies deal, the relevant data are highly informative.
For current purposes, this point is the crucial one.
II. INDIVIDUATION
My basic claim is that VSL will inevitably vary across both risks
and persons. If people's WTP is higher to avoid cancer risks than risks
of unanticipated, sudden deaths, then the use of a VSL, drawn from
studies of the latter risks, will provide insufficient protection of the
exposed population. If people in different occupations are paid
78. See RICHARD POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 166 (2004) ("I[T]here is
no reason to think that the relation between the risk of death and the perceived cost of the risk
is linear.").
79. Id.
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different amounts to incur a risk, then use of a uniform VSL will not
track actual behavior, which is what it is supposed to do.80 If wealthy
people show a higher WTP than poor people, then a uniform WTP
based on a population-wide median will ensure insufficient protection
of wealthy people and excessive protection of poor people in a way
that might well prove harmful to both groups." And if the use of WTP
is justified on grounds of welfare and autonomy, then a more
individuated approach is justified on those same grounds.
This Part begins by considering differences among risks and then
explores differences among persons. It explains and endorses the
claim that in theory, full individuation, giving all people the risk
reduction for which they are willing to pay, is required by the
prevailing theory. From this point, it emphasizes the problem with full
individuation, which is that it is not feasible. But an intermediate
approach, moving in that direction, would make a great deal of sense.
The Part concludes with a discussion of the implications for
administrative law.
A. Risks
I have emphasized that the data that underlie the $6.1 million
VSL used by the EPA come from risks of accidents in the
workplace-and that even if these data could be generalized, they
would not justify a probability-independent VSL. But there is a point
of greater practical importance. A 1/100,000 risk of dying in a
workplace accident might well produce a different WTP from a
1/100,000 risk of dying of cancer from air pollution, which might in
turn be different from a 1/100,000 risk of dying in an airplane as a
result of a terrorist attack or a 1/100,000 risk of dying as a result of a
defective snowmobile. The very theory that lies behind the
government's current use of VSL justifies a simple conclusion: VSL
should be risk-specific; it should not be the same across statistically
equivalent risks. The use of a single number almost certainly produces
significant blunders and incorrect decisions about the appropriate
amount of regulatory protection.
1. Data. To test these issues in a highly preliminary way, I
conducted a small contingent valuation study. Eighty-four University
80. Viscusi, supra note 55, at 33, 39-41.
81. On the "might well," see infra Part III.B.
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of Chicago law students were asked about their WTP to eliminate
each of five risks of 1/100,000. The simplest of these risks involved
dying from an automobile accident as a result of a defective brake.
The four other risks might be expected to occasion greater concern;
they involved deaths from lung cancer, AIDS, Alzheimer's disease,
and airplane crashes resulting from terrorist attacks. The 1/100,000
risk of dying in an automobile accident produced a mean WTP of
$156, whereas the four other accidents produced significantly higher
values (ranging from $184 for the AIDS risk to $193 for Alzheimer's
disease). In addition, there was substantial heterogeneity across
individuals. For each of the questions, about ten respondents were
willing to pay nothing to eliminate the 1/100,000 risk, producing a
VSL of zero. At the opposite end of the spectrum, about fifteen
people were willing to pay at least $500 to eliminate each of the
1/100,000 risks, producing a VSL of $50 million. This informal study
suggests that even within a relatively homogenous group (law
students), people do not treat statistically identical risks in the same
way, and indeed there are differences across persons as well as across
risks.
With respect to the data on which agencies generally rely, notice
initially that the very category of "workplace risks" conceals relevant
differences. The American economy contains a wide range of
occupations and industries, and a uniform VSL should not be
expected to emerge from each of them. Indeed, a recent study finds
significant differences across both occupations and industries," with
blue-collar workers showing a higher VSL than others. 3 It is
inevitable that a wide range of values would emerge from studies
looking separately at machine operators, executives, sales associates,
dental technicians, equipment cleaners, security guards, and
secretaries'-and diverse values undoubtedly could be found within
each category.
In addition, many risks controlled by the EPA are qualitatively
different from the workplace risks that the EPA has used to generate
its VSL. Two differences are particularly important. First, the
workplace studies do not involve cancer, and cancer risks are often
involved in environmental decisions. There is considerable evidence
82. Viscusi, supra note 55, at 39-41.
83. Id.
84. See id. at 33 (containing data clearly indicating that separate numbers for different
occupation groups would emerge).
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that the risks associated with cancer produce a higher WTP than
other kinds of risk.s5 For example, Professors Hammitt and Liu find
that in Taiwan, WTP to eliminate a cancer risk is about one-third
higher than WTP to avoid a risk of a similar, chronic degenerative
disease.86 Some contingent valuation studies suggest that people are
willing to pay twice as much to prevent a cancer death as an
instantaneous death.' People seem to have a special fear of cancer,
and they seem to be willing to pay more to prevent a cancer death
than a sudden, unanticipated death, or a death from heart disease.8
The "cancer premium" might be produced by the "dread" nature of
cancer; it seems well established that dreaded risks produce special
social concern, holding the statistical risk constant s9
To be sure, existing evidence on this count is not unambiguous.
One study of occupational exposures does not find a significantly
higher VSL for cancer risks.' But that study assumes that
occupational cancers account for 10 to 20 percent of all cancer
deaths-an amount that is almost certainly too high. If occupational
exposures account for 5 percent of all cancers-a far more realistic
number-then the VSL for cancer risks may be as high as $12 million,
about double the amount that the EPA now uses. The current
findings conflict;9" but in principle, the VSL figures should be risk-
specific, and existing evidence generally supports the view that cancer
risks produce an unusually high VSL.
85. Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the
Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941, 972-74 (1999); Hammitt & Liu, supra
note 11, at 74.
86. Id. at 84.
87. Id. at 81.
88. See George Tolley et al., State-of-the-Art Health Values, in VALUING HEALTH FOR
POLICY 323, 339-40 (George Tolley et al. eds., 1994) (arguing that the value of avoiding a
mortality risk preceded by morbidity includes the value of avoiding an instantaneous death plus
the value of avoiding the preceding years afflicted with the particular condition).
89. See Revesz, supra note 85, at 972-74 (discussing "the dread aspects of carcinogenic
deaths" and their impact on WTP studies). See generally PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF
RISK (2000) (exploring how risk perception affects individual behavior).
90. See Viscusi & Aldy, supra note 10, at 57 (finding that estimates of values for cancer
mortality and accidental death were similar); see also Wesley A. Magat et al., A Reference
Lottery Metric for Valuing Health, 42 MGMT. SCI. 1118, 1129 (1996) (finding no difference
between valuations of cancer deaths and auto accident deaths).
91. See Viscusi & Aldy, supra note 10, at 57 (contrasting the United Kingdom Health and
Safety Executive's use of a higher VSL for cancer deaths with the recommendation of the
EPA's SAB not to make any "dread" modification to VSL for certain risks).
2004]
HeinOnline  -- 54 Duke L.J. 407 2004-2005
DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54:385
The second difference between workplace risks and the risks that
concern the EPA is that the latter risks seem peculiarly involuntary
and uncontrollable. 92 Unlike the risks of 'workplace accidents,
pollution risks are not assumed voluntarily in return for1 3
compensation. A great deal of literature suggests that involuntary,
dread, uncontrollable, and potentially catastrophic risks produce
unusually high levels of public concern." If so, the numbers that
derive from workplace accidents will substantially understate WTP
for regulatory benefits provided by the EPA and many other
agencies.95
The implications of risk-specific VSL go well beyond the
distinction between workplace accidents and environmental risks. For
example, people appear to be willing to pay far more to produce
safety in the air than on the highways; it follows that VSL should be
higher for the FAA than for the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration. Oddly, the former agency has an unusually low
rather than an unusually high VSL.97 Some diseases would produce a
higher VSL than others. A 1/100,000 risk of death from Alzheimer's
disease, for example, would almost certainly produce a higher VSL
92. See, e.g., ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 9, at 147 (arguing that
environmental risks are involuntary because they are "not allocated, even in theory, according
to market transactions"); Sunstein, supra note 54, at 2285 ("The risk of cancer from drinking
water is qualitatively different from the workplace risks that the EPA used to generate its VSL.
The risks from drinking water seem peculiarly involuntary and uncontrollable, and a great deal
of literature suggests that involuntary and uncontrollable risks produce individual concern.").
93. Of course it is possible to question the idea that workplace risks are assumed
voluntarily and in return for compensation. For example, many workers probably do not know
the risks that they face. The distinction that I am drawing here is one of kind rather than degree.
See Cass R. Sunstein, Bad Deaths, 14 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 259, 272 (1997) (proposing that
low-wage workers involuntarily assume risks because they lack information).
94. See, e.g., Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 SCIENCE 280, 282-83 (1987).
95. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 54, at 2285 ("As compared to workplace risks, there can
be little doubt that the risk of arsenic from drinking water is worse along the relevant
dimensions. For this reason, it makes sense to think that people would be willing to pay a
premium to avoid the risks associated with arsenic."). See generally ACKERMAN &
HEINZERLING, supra note 9.
96. See Carlsson et al., supra note 12, at 159 (finding that people's WTP to reduce the risk
of flying is double their WTP to reduce the risk of traveling by taxi, because the fear of flying
produces particular mental suffering).
97. See supra Table 1 (listing the VSL for the FAA as $2.7 to $3 million depending on the
regulation); OFFICE OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION, NAT'L HIGHWAY
TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., NPRM ON TIRE PRESSURE MONITORING SYSTEM FMVSS
NO. 138, available at http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/rules/rulings/TPMS_FMVSSNo138/
index.htnl#Contents (Sept. 2004) (documenting the cost-benefit analysis of a safety regulation
using a VSL range from $3.5 to $5.5 million).
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than a 1/100,000 risk of death from a heart attack; a 1/50,000 risk of an
AIDS death would not produce the same VSL as a 1/50,000 risk of
death from a defective brake system on an automobile; most people
would pay more to reduce a risk of dying from slow-acting strokes
than from strokes that kill outright. There should be a distinctive,
population-wide median VSL for mortality risks of airplane accidents,
of cancer from air pollution, of motor vehicle accidents, of defective
toys, of cancer from water pollution.
In fact studies that have been done for seatbelt use, automobile
safety, home fire detectors, and more find a wide variety of numbers,
producing a VSL ranging from $770,000 (smoke detectors, based on
data from the 1970s) to $9.9 million (fatality risks associated with
safety belts and motorcycle helmets).9" And within each of these
categories of risk, further distinctions would undoubtedly emerge. All
cancer fatalities are not the same; informed people would surely
make distinctions between those that involve long periods of suffering
and those that do not. If agencies are really interested in basing VSL
on WTP, then a uniform number, treating all statistically identical
mortality risks as the same, is fatally obtuse.
2. Practice. The claim that VSL should vary by the type of risk
is not entirely foreign to current regulatory policy. In the context of
arsenic regulation, for example, the EPA was alert to some such
variations." Hence its own sensitivity analysis for arsenic suggested
the need for an upward revision of 7 percent because of the
involuntariness and uncontrollability of the risk. 1°° With this revision,
along with the revision for income growth, VSL would rise from $6.1
million to $7.2 million.101 In fact there are reasons to suggest that this
amount might be far too low. Dean Revesz suggests that "the value of
avoiding a death from an involuntary, carcinogenic risk should be
98. Viscusi & Aldy, supra note 10, at 25.
99. See National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Arsenic and Clarifications to
Compliance and New Source Contaminants Monitoring, 66 Fed. Reg. 6976, 7014 (Jan. 22, 2001)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 141, and 142) (demonstrating "the effects of incorporating a 7%
increase for voluntariness and controllability," based on a study indicating that "individuals may
place a slightly higher [WTP] on risks where exposure is neither voluntary nor controllable by
the individual"); see also Sunstein, supra note 54, at 2285 (arguing that the EPA's "own
sensitivity analysis suggests the need for an upwards revision of seven percent because of the
involuntariness and uncontrollability of the risk").
100. National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Arsenic and Clarifications to
Compliance and New Source Contaminants Monitoring, 66 Fed. Reg. at 7014.
101. Id.
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estimated as four times as large as the value of avoiding an
instantaneous workplace fatality."' °2 Under this approach, the VSL, in
the context of arsenic, jumps from $6.1 million to $24.3 million. I am
not arguing that $24.3 million is the correct number; I am suggesting
only that VSL, based on WTP, is almost certainly risk-specific.
3. Qualifications. Three qualifications are important. First,
psychological studies showing heightened public concern 3 about
particular risks may not translate into higher WTP. Social scientists
might be able to show that certain qualitative factors make people
especially concerned about certain risks, but it is an independent
question whether and how much their WTP increases as a result.
Fortunately, a number of studies of WTP at least suggest answers to
that question, demonstrating that VSL should vary significantly
across risk types."°4
Second, there is no simple or rigid distinction between the
involuntary/uncontrollable and the voluntary/controllable. 5 It is a
mistake to believe that risks can be neatly separated into the two
categories. Are the risks from air pollution in Los Angeles
involuntarily incurred? The answer might seem to be affirmative, but
people can choose whether to live in Los Angeles. Are the risks of
airplane travel uncontrollable? Many people think so, but the
decision to fly is itself under human control. Death from an asteroid
seems to be a model case of involuntariness, at an opposite pole from
hang gliding. But why? In deciding whether a risk is faced
involuntarily or whether it is within personal control, the underlying
issues seem to be whether those exposed to the risk are exposed
knowingly and whether it is costly or otherwise difficult for people to
avoid the risk.'O When risks are approached in these terms, it is clear
that some risks are worse than others, even if the probability of harm
102. Revesz, supra note 85, at 982.
103. See SLOVIC, supra note 89, at 232-35 (discussing public concern about extremely
minimal but highly publicized risks such as nuclear mishaps or genetic engineering).
104. For VSL calculations based on types of diseases and disease latency periods, see
Hammitt & Liu, supra note 11, at 88. For a metanalysis, see generally Viscusi & Aldy, supra
note 10.
105. Sunstein, supra note 54, at 2285; see Sunstein, supra note 93, at 272 ("[T]he question
whether a risk is run voluntarily or not is often not a categorical one but instead a matter of
degree, associated with information cost, risk-reduction cost, and the existence or not of
accompanying benefits.").
106. Sunstein, supra note 93, at 272.
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is identical. This point is enough to suggest that VSL cannot be
uniform across risks.
Third, it is possible that extreme aversion to certain risks reflects
a form of bounded rationality 1 -and it is doubtful whether that
extreme aversion should be allowed to play a role in regulatory
policy. Suppose, for example, that people really are willing to pay
twice as much to avoid a cancer risk as to avoid a sudden,
unanticipated death. Must these numbers be decisive for purposes of
policy, assuming that the contingent valuation study is reliable? They
might not be if there is reason to believe that the WTP figures are not
accurately measuring welfare. And is it even plausible to think that
the "cancer premium" is so high that it actually doubles the cost of
death? Is it reasonable to think that a death from cancer is actually
twice as bad as a death that is sudden and unanticipated? To be sure,
a degree of pain and suffering typically accompanies cancer, and that
fact illustrates the obtuseness of using the same number for cancer
risks as for risks of sudden, unanticipated deaths. But it is not easy to
defend the set of (exotic) values that would lead to the conclusion
that the relevant pain and suffering is as bad as death itself. If WTP
does not accurately measure welfare in the case of cancer, and if the
inflated numbers for cancer deaths are a product of an intuitive recoil
or terror at the idea of cancer, then regulators should not use the
unrealistically high monetary values.
For those who emphasize autonomy rather than welfare, perhaps
this point does not amount to an objection to the use of WTP. If the
goal is to respect people's autonomy, regulators should defer to their
judgments even if those judgments are mistaken. But if people show
an especially high WTP because of a visceral reaction to cancer, or
because of insufficiently thoughtful assessments of the stakes, then it
is not clear that autonomy calls for following WTP. Government does
not respect people's autonomy if it follows their uninformed choices;
this proposition raises doubts about government's use of uninformed
WTP. To be least controversial, WTP numbers would reflect
informed rather than reflexive judgments about the nature of the
harms involved.
107. See Sunstein, supra note 8, at 248 ("WTP will be a poor proxy for welfare in cases in
which we have good reason to suppose that underestimation or overestimation is likely. Of
course government officials should be reluctant to second-guess citizens, but in some cases, the
second-guessing is well justified.").
20041
HeinOnline  -- 54 Duke L.J. 411 2004-2005
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
B. Persons
Even when risks are identical, people are heterogeneous in their
values and their preferences. The $6.1 million itself is the median
figure-it is the median of a set of means. But everyone agrees that in
workplaces and elsewhere, individual WTP is highly variable. Some
of the variability stems from different degrees of aversion to different
risks. Some people are especially concerned to avoid the dangers
associated with pesticides, whereas others focus on the risks of air
travel. Some of these differences are a product of beliefs about
existing risk levels and others of tastes and values. So too, people with
high levels of background risk should be expected to be willing to pay
less to avoid an additional risk of 1/100,000 than those with low levels
of background risk. If, for example, a relevant population faces thirty
annual mortality risks of 1/10,000 or higher, it should be expected to
show a lower VSL with respect to a new risk of 1/100,000 than a
population whose background risks are less serious."° The difference
between the VSL of people in wealthy nations and that of people in
poor nations, taken up in Part IV, is partly a product of the fact that
the latter group generally faces far higher background risks.
It is likely that WTP varies with respect to age as well. It is
reasonable to predict that other things being equal, older people will
show a lower WTP and hence a lower VSL, simply because they have
fewer years left. One study, for example, finds that the VSL of a
forty-eight-year-old is 10 percent lower than that of a thirty-six-year-
old; another finds that people under forty-five have a VSL twenty
times higher than people over sixty-five.' 9 The most careful analysis
suggests that VSL peaks around age thirty, stays constant for about a
decade, but declines from that point, so much so that the VSL for a
sixty-year-old is approximately half of that of a person between thirty
and forty."1 These findings raise particular conundrums in the case of
people under eighteen; how should government proceed if the VSL
108. See Louis R. Eeckhoudt & James K. Hammitt, Background Risks and the Value of a
Statistical Life, 23 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 261, 264-65 (2001) (illustrating that VSL decreases
as the aggregate risk of a population increases).
109. See Viscusi & Aldy, supra note 10, at 50-51. But see Sunstein, supra note 8, at 227
(hypothesizing that older people may be willing to pay more than younger people to eliminate
risk, giving older people a higher VSL).
110. See ALDY & VISCUSI, supra note 15, at 42 (calculating a VSL of $5.76 million for
people between twenty-eight and thirty-two years of age, $4.83 million for people between
thirty-eight and forty-two years of age, and $2.51 million for people between fifty-eight and
sixty-two years of age).
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for those between infancy and fifteen years of age is low, simply
because they have little or no money? It is implausible to use a tiny
VSL for them, but what number should be used, and why? Little
progress has been made on this question,'11 with the government using
its ordinary, uniform number for children as for everyone else."2 But
if the vexing case of valuing children is put to one side, then the
prevailing theory suggests a lower VSL for those in the last stages of
life than for those who have many decades to live-and this
difference ought to be reflected in regulatory policy."'
Along the same lines, many analysts suggest that regulatory
policy should focus not on the value of statistical lives but on the
value of statistical life-years (VSLY)."4 Suppose that they are right. If
so, then the statistical lives of young people are likely to be worth
more than the statistical lives of older people. The government's
interest in focusing on VSLY led to widespread public objections to
what, under one proposal, would seem to be a "senior death
discount." That discount would have valued someone over seventy as
"worth" $.62 on the dollar."' But assuming that people over seventy
are willing to pay about 62 percent, on average, of what younger
people are willing to pay, the theory that underlies current practice
justifies exactly this disparity. If the theory is right (a question to
which I will turn"'), then a disparity between older people and
younger people makes perfect sense to the extent that the WTP
figures justify it. Note in particular that if each person has a
presumptive right to a life of decent length, then the use of the life-
111. For an overview that turns out to be highly tentative and indeterminate, see generally
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CHILDREN'S HEALTH VALUATION HANDBOOK (2003). For discussion,
see Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars and Death, 72 U. CHI. L. REv. 537 (2005).
112. See ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 111, at 3-12 ("[Tjhere is not sufficient support
in the economics literature for making adjustments to the existing estimates to account for the
impact of age (including children) .. " (citing ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, GUIDELINES FOR
PREPARING ECONOMIC ANALYSES (2000))).
113. See Sunstein, supra note 8, at 206-08 (arguing that agencies should use VSLY when
analyzing the costs and benefits of a proposed regulation, to take into account that older people
have fewer life-years remaining).
114. Id. at 206; see, e.g., Richard Zeckhauser & Donald Shepard, Where Now for Saving
Lives?, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 11-15 (Autumn 1976) (measuring utility in terms of
"quality-adjusted life years").
115. See Sunstein, supra note 8, at 206-08 (discussing the EPA's proposal to vary VSL based
on age by setting the VSL for those under seventy at $3.7 million and the VSL for those seventy
and older at $2.3 million).
116. See infra Part III.
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years approach has a great deal of appeal, because it is likely to lead
to special efforts to ensure that everyone enjoys that right.
Even more fundamentally, those with little to spare will show a
far lower VSL than those who have plenty. WTP depends on ability
to pay, and when ability to pay is low, WTP will be low as well,
holding preferences constant. For this reason the VSL of people with
an annual income of $50,000 will be lower than that of people with an
annual income of $150,000. People in the former category might be
willing to pay no more than $25 to reduce a risk of 1/100,000, whereas
people in the latter group might be willing to pay as much as $100. If
so, government should not require everyone to pay $100; its decision
to do so would harm those unwilling to pay that amount.' 7 A uniform
VSL, of the sort that government now uses, threatens to
"overprotect" the poor, in a way that might well be harmful to them.
At the same time, the uniform VSL threatens to underprotect the
wealthy, in a way that is highly likely to be harmful to them."'
As a simple matter of fact, it would be expected that unionized
workers would receive more compensation for incurring risks-and
studies almost always show a higher VSL for unionized workers, with
amounts as high as $12.3 million, $18.1 million, and even $44.2
million."' Large differences across nations would also be expected,
with VSL being higher in rich countries than in poor ones. And in
fact, studies find a VSL as low as $200,000 for Taiwan, $500,000 for
South Korea, and $1.2 million for India-but $21.7 million for
Canada and $19 million for Australia. ° Consider, for purposes of
illustration, the following table:2'
117. I am assuming adequate information and unbounded rationality. See infra text
accompanying note 158.
118. Compare this with the EPA's explicit and unexplained refusal to consider differences
"in age, health status, socioeconomic status, gender or other characteristic of the adult
population." National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for
Industrial/Commercial/Institutional Boilers and Process Heaters, 68 Fed. Reg. 1660, 1695
(proposed Jan. 13, 2003) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63).
119. Viscusi & Aldy, supra note 10, at 45.
120. Id. at 27-28.
121. See id.
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TABLE 3: VSL ACROSS NATIONS
Nation and Year of Study VSL (in 2000 US$)
Taiwan (1997) .2-.9 million
South Korea (1993) .8 million
India (1996/97) 1.2-1.5 million
Hong Kong (1998) 1.7 million
Canada (1989) 3.9-4.7 million
Switzerland (2001) 6.3-8.6 million
Japan (1991) 9.7 million
Australia (1997) 11.3-19.1 million
United Kingdom (2000) 19.9 million
It would follow that within the United States, wealthy
populations would show a higher VSL than poorer populations. If a
program is designed to combat health risks in wealthy suburbs, the
VSL should be above the population-wide median; if the protected
population is mostly in poor areas, the VSL should be below this
median. Currently agencies pay no attention to this possibility in
undertaking cost-benefit analysis."
What about the more controversial categories of race and
gender? Recent studies show significant differences. Using workplace
data from 1996 to 1998, Professors Leeth and Ruser find that
women's VSL ranges from $8.1 million to $10.2 million, whereas
men's VSL is less than half that amount, ranging from $2.6 million to
$4.7 million.123 Leeth and Ruser find that Hispanic males show a
slightly higher VSL than white males ($5 million compared to $3.4
million) .121 Most strikingly, African Americans receive no
compensation for workplace risks, producing a VSL of zero.25 Using
workplace data from 1992 through 1997, Professor Viscusi also finds a
significant disparity across racial lines, though his numbers are quite
122. See Adler & Posner, supra note 5, at 1136-39 (arguing that the failure to take into
account the differences in marginal utility between wealthy and poor people distorts cost-
benefit analysis).
123. Leeth & Ruser, supra note 19, at 266.
124. Id. at 270.
125. See id. at 275 (concluding that fatal injury risk compensation for black males is negative
but insignificant).
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different from those found by Leeth and Ruser" 6 In Viscusi's study,
the VSL is highest for white males and lowest for African-American
males, with white and African-American females falling between the
poles. More particularly, Viscusi finds that the overall white VSL is
$15 million, whereas the overall African-American VSL is $7.2
million.1 17 For white females, the overall VSL is $9.4 million,
compared to $18.8 million for white males; for African-American
females, the overall VSL is $6.9 million, compared to $5.9 million for
African-American males.128 Another study by Viscusi finds a VSL of
$7 million for blue-collar males and $8.5 million for blue-collar
females.9
What accounts for these differences? It should be expected that
whites as a class will show a higher WTP and hence VSL than African
Americans as a class. Simply because whites are wealthier, their WTP
will be higher too. Might the same be expected within job categories?
Perhaps the answer is yes, if past or present discrimination, or
different starting points, produce racial disparities in compensation
for risk within similar jobs. The precise causes and levels of the
disparities are unclear, and the differences between Professors Leeth
and Ruser on the one hand and Professor Viscusi on the other remain
a puzzle. There is no a priori reason to think that men or women
would show a higher VSL. If the relevant group of women is
wealthier, then its WTP should be higher too. And if women are more
averse to mortality risks than men, they will show a higher WTP, just
because they will demand a higher premium. For my purposes, the
central point is that demographic differences in VSL are entirely to
be expected, and they are found in both studies.
C. Theory and Practice
If the foregoing points are put together, it is apparent that there
is not one VSL, but an exceptionally large number of VSLs. In fact
each of us has not one VSL but a number of them, targeted to each
risk that each of us faces. A policy that truly tracked WTP, and based
VSL on WTP, would seek to provide all people with the level of
protection for which they are willing to pay to reduce each risk.
126. See Viscusi, supra note 16, at 252 (calculating fatality risk estimates and implicit VSL by
race, sex, and income category).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Viscusi, supra note 55, at 39.
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Tracking WTP is the goal that underlies current practice; and apart
from questions of administrability, it calls for a maximum level of
individuation.
1. A Thought Experiment. As a thought experiment, suppose
that an all-knowing regulator could costlessly determine each
person's WTP for each statistical risk that he faces-and perfectly
match the level of regulatory protection to that WTP. In these
circumstances, the regulator should give all people no more and no
less than their WTP for each risk that they face. (In cases in which
people's WTP was low because of poverty, they might be subsidized;
but they would not be forced to purchase goods for an amount in
excess of their WTP. I will return to this point,13° but subsidies are not
my topic here.) Under this approach, regulatory benefits would be
treated the same as every other commodity that is traded on markets,
including safety itself. Of course most people face extremely serious
problems in dealing with risk, stemming both from an absence of
information and from bounded rationality.13 The all-knowing
regulator would overcome these problems and provide people with
what they would want if they did not suffer from them.
If agencies could do this, then the current theory would be
perfectly implemented. It would follow that with full individuation,
overall WTP would be lower for poor people than for wealthy people,
for African Americans than for whites, and (possibly) for men than
for women. But, under this thought experiment, government would
not discriminate against groups; for example, it would neither decide
on high VSLs for programs predominantly benefiting whites nor
decide on low VSLs for programs predominantly benefiting African
Americans. The difference would be a product of aggregation of fully
individual VSLs-aggregation of the kind that most conventional
markets, including those for automobiles and consumer goods, now
provide. Recall that the use of WTP is justified because of its
connection with welfare and individual autonomy. If so, then fully
individual VSLs are justified on those same grounds.
130. See infra text accompanying notes 148-49.
131. See David A. Strauss, Why Was Lochner Wrong?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 384 (2003).
See generally Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN L
REv. 1471, 1518-20 (1998) (arguing that despite adequate information consumers sometimes do
not make well-informed choices because of their inability to process the information).
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Of course there are two practical problems with taking the
thought experiment seriously. The first is that agencies do not know
the WTP of every individual, and as a practical matter, it is not
possible to find out. The second problem is that regulatory benefits
are often collective goods-goods that cannot feasibly be provided to
one without also being provided to many. In the context of air
pollution, for example, it is not possible to provide cleaner air for
some without providing cleaner air for many or all. In regulating air
pollution and water pollution, individuation is simply not an option.
These problems are fatal objections to full individuation. But
they are not fatal objections to more individuation. At a minimum,
agencies should be encouraged to take account of existing research in
their sensitivity analyses, which would result (for example) in
increased "upper bound" estimates for cancer risks.'32 In addition,
disparities in VSL findings might be mapped onto different agency
estimates, producing reasonable rather than arbitrary differences in
VSL across agencies. If, for example, the risks of death from
workplace accidents produce a lower number than the risks of death
from consumer products, then the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration should use a lower VSL than the Consumer Products
Safety Commission. It is easy to imagine a research program in which
the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs would attempt to
elicit far more information on VSL across different risks. A
movement in this direction need not raise troubling ethical questions.
It would be far more controversial to suggest that agencies
should adopt different VSLs depending on whether the affected
population is especially wealthy or especially poor. But at the very
least, agencies should adjust VSL to changes in national wealth over
time, producing a higher amount than would result from inflation
adjustments alone.133 Or suppose, for example, that a regulation is
designed to protect migrant farmworkers, expected to show a low
VSL. Current studies in fact estimate the relationship between
income and WTP,' 3' allowing agencies to make suitable adjustments
to their VSLs. And when the population is relatively wealthy, the
agency might adopt a higher VSL. For present purposes, I am
132. See supra note 74 (discussing the sensitivity analysis for cancer risks from arsenic).
133. Cf Sunstein, supra note 54, at 2284-85 (discussing the rationale behind adjusting VSL
for increases in national wealth).
134. See Viscusi & Aldy, supra note 10, at 36-43 (using a metanalysis of U.S. and
international VSLs to determine the relationship between income and WTP).
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suggesting only that an approach of this kind is indicated by the
theory that government now uses. I turn in Part III to the larger
questions that such an approach would make it necessary to answer.
2. Optimal Individuation: An Intermediate Approach. The
larger question is simple: What is the optimal level of individuation
with respect to the value of life? The answer depends in part on how
much is known. Even in markets, individuals are not usually asked, or
charged, their particular WTP. In real estate markets, negotiation
between individuals is the usual practice. But for ordinary consumer
goods--cereal, soap, casebooks, subscriptions to law reviews-a
standard price emerges from the forces of supply and demand. It
seems clear that a uniform VSL, cutting across domains in which
those forces almost certainly establish disparate amounts, fits poorly
with the theory that currently underlies government practice. It is also
clear that full individuation is not feasible. The appropriate approach
depends on two familiar variables: the costs of decisions and the costs
of errors. In the early years of cost-benefit analysis, a uniform number
was probably the best that agencies could do. As better information
emerges about different VSLs across risks and persons, the use of a
uniform number will be increasingly difficult to support. If those
differences are substantial, the argument for further differentiation
will be strengthened. A uniform number might be seen as a plausible
"first-generation" response to the problems posed by cost-benefit
analysis. The second generation is now well underway, and hence
finer distinctions will be increasingly hard to resist.
3. Administrative Law. How would the use of more
individuated VSLs bear on the legality of agency action? Courts have
started to develop principles by which to review agency decisions
about how to assess the costs and benefits of regulation."' Some
statutes explicitly require agencies to balance costs against benefits,
and under such statutes an agency's choices about valuation might be
135. The leading case is Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991).
There, the Fifth Circuit explained: "[T]he proper course ... is to consider each regulatory
option, beginning with the least burdensome, and the costs and benefits of regulation under
each option .... Without doing this it is impossible . . . to know that none of these alternatives
was less burdensome than the ban ... chosen by the agency." Id. at 1217 (citation omitted); see
also Am. Dental Ass'n v. Martin, 984 F.2d 823, 831 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that the court's role
is not to evaluate the quality, necessity, or cost-benefit rationale of an agency regulation, but
"merely to patrol the boundary of reasonableness").
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challenged as unreasonable or arbitrary. 13 6 If an agency used a VSL of
$200,000, it would almost certainly be assigning an arbitrarily and
hence unlawfully low monetary value; if it used a VSL of $40 million,
its selection would be arbitrarily high.137 In all cases agencies are
required to produce a reasonable explanation for why they have
proceeded one way rather than another.
In view of the arguments made thus far, it is easy to imagine legal
challenges to agency decisions. Suppose that the EPA continues to
use the $6.1 million VSL based on workplace studies. The agency's
decision would be vulnerable on several grounds. First, it might be
too low in light of the growth in national income. Second, it would fail
to account for evidence that pollution risks, especially if cancer is
involved, produce a higher VSL than workplace risks. Third, it would
not, on the facts stated, come to terms with the possibility that the
protected group might be wealthier or poorer than the group involved
in the workplace studies. All of these challenges are plausible under
existing law. As new and better data emerge, they become stronger
still. It is certainly possible that a decade from now, the use of a
uniform figure will seem obtuse, even indefensible.
Is there anything that agencies might say in defense of a uniform
VSL? They might urge that the existing evidence is too ambiguous
and contestable to justify a change in current practice. Most studies
based on more recent data find a VSL in the range of $6.1 million.139
With respect to cancer, the EPA's Science Advisory Board (SAB)
rejected an upward revision for especially dread illnesses, finding that
the existing literature did not justify any such revision;1' and some
136. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2605(c) (2000) (requiring cost-benefit analysis of regulations of
chemical substances or mixtures under the Toxic Substances Control Act).
137. This is an implication of Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1223, in which the Fifth
Circuit found an EPA regulation costing $23.7 million and saving one-third of a life
unreasonable.
138. See id. at 1220-22 (holding that the EPA must provide a "reasonable basis" for a
proffered regulation).
139. See, e.g., Leeth & Ruser, supra note 19, at 265-67 (finding a VSL slightly lower than
previous studies' findings of $4.1 million to $9.6 million).
140. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, AN SAB REPORT ON EPA'S WHITE PAPER VALUING THE
BENEFITS OF FATAL CANCER RISK REDUCrION 5-6 (2000) (finding that "existing studies
provide little reliable information as to the magnitude of [the dread premium associated with
cancer]" and that, "until better information becomes available, it is best not to assign such a
premium"), available at http://www.epa.gov/sciencel/pdf/eeacfO13.pdf.
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evidence directly supports the view of the SAB.'4 ' To be sure, it is
more than plausible to think that VSL is wealth-dependent; but the
EPA might urge that a uniform number is preferable on moral and
distributive grounds and is not greatly out of line with existing
evidence. In any case, a single number might have the advantage of
easy administrability-and produce results that in general would be
the same as those produced by imaginable variations. Most of the
time, the agency's choice will not be affected if it selects a VSL of $3.5
million or $10 million; in such situations, a uniform number seems
acceptable.
In many cases, I believe that these responses are unconvincing as
a matter of policy. But in light of the properly limited role of courts in
the oversight of agency action, they are convincing as a matter of
law.142 Courts should allow agencies considerable room to maneuver
here, at least until the evidence against a uniform VSL becomes
overwhelming. Permission to adopt such a number has an important
corollary: an agency would be on firm legal ground if it attempted to
make adjustments of the sort that I have suggested, even if current
evidence does not unambiguously support those adjustments.
III. WHY WTP? EASY CASES, HARD CASES
Thus far I have assumed that the theory behind current practice
is straightforward-that it depends on an empirical elicitation of
people's WTP as the foundation for VSL. If the assumption is correct,
then a high degree of individuation is justified. But perhaps the
assumption is false. Perhaps the prevailing theory does rely on
elicited WTP but also adopts a norm in favor of the equality of
persons (and possibly mortality risks as well). Might that more
complex theory be correct? In any case, what is the argument for
embodying people's actual WTP in regulatory policy? Why should
anyone care about actual WTP at all? Why should government
conduct cost-benefit analysis with close reference to VSL?' 4"
141. See Viscusi & Aldy, supra note 10, at 57 (noting that the SAB's rejection of the "dread
effect" of cancer is supported by the finding that contingent valuation estimates of cancer
mortality risks are similar to estimates for accidental deaths).
142. See Sunstein, supra note 54, at 2292-93, for a more extended discussion.
143. Some support for this position can be found in the remarks of the EPA. See supra
note 7.
144. These questions are pressed in ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 9.
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It is now time to attend to those issues in more detail. This Part
begins by discussing what I call "easy cases," in which the
beneficiaries of regulation must pay for it. I suggest that in such cases,
WTP is the appropriate foundation for VSL, because beneficiaries are
hardly helped by being forced to pay for regulatory programs that
they believe not to be in their interests. The major qualification here
involves lack of information and bounded rationality. I then attempt
to defend the claim that the analysis must be different in "hard
cases," in which beneficiaries pay for little or none of the cost of what
they receive. But even in such cases, an optimal income tax, providing
the right level of redistribution, would go a long way toward justifying
a variable VSL. If a nation lacks an optimal income tax, and seeks
greater redistribution, the use of a VSL that exceeds the WTP of the
beneficiaries might produce desirable redistribution or be justified on
welfare grounds. I outline the circumstances in which this might be so.
A. Easy Cases
For the sake of simplicity, assume a society in which people face
multiple risks of 1/100,000, and in which every person is both
adequately informed and willing to pay no more and no less than $60
to eliminate each of those risks. Assume too that the cost of
eliminating these 1/100,000 risks is widely variable, ranging from close
to zero to many billions of dollars. Assume finally that the cost of
eliminating any risk is borne entirely by those who benefit from risk
elimination. Under that assumption, regulation imposes the
equivalent of a user fee; for example, people's water bills will entirely
reflect the costs of a policy that eliminates a 1/100,000 risk of getting
cancer from arsenic in drinking water. If the per-person cost is $100,
each water bill will be increased by exactly that amount.
1. Welfare and Autonomy. With these assumptions, the
argument for using WTP to calculate VSL is straightforward.
Regulation amounts to a forced exchange; it tells people that they
must purchase certain benefits for a certain amount. Why should
government force people to pay for things that they do not want?
Begin with welfare. By hypothesis, a forced exchange on terms that
people dislike will make them worse off. The case for using WTP
depends on the simple idea that government should make Pareto
superior moves (those making at least one person better off without
making anyone worse off) and that it should avoid making Pareto
inferior moves (those making at least one person worse off without
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making anyone better off). At first glance, use of WTP, on the
assumptions that I am making, seems hard to contest.
14 1
For purposes of evaluating regulation, it does not matter if the
existing distribution of income is unjust or if poor people are, in an
intelligible sense, coerced to run certain risks. The remedy for unjust
distributions, and for that form of coercion, is not to require people to
buy regulatory benefits on terms that they find unacceptable. Suppose
that people are willing to pay only $60 to eliminate a 1/100,000 risk
because they are not rich, and that if they had double their current
wealth, they would be willing to pay $120. Government does people
no favors by forcing them to pay the amount that they would pay if
they had more money.
I have suggested that for those who do not believe that
regulatory decisions should be based on welfare, considerations of
autonomy point in the same direction.' 6 Those who refuse to pay a
certain amount to eliminate a risk of 1/100,000 might want to use their
resources for other things-medical care, children, food, recreation,
entertainment, savings. If people are entitled to a kind of sovereignty
over the conduct of their own lives, then they should be permitted to
make such allocations as they choose. It is most standard to justify use
of VTP on welfare grounds, but the same approach is at least equally
defensible as a means of respecting the autonomy of persons.'1
7
Consider how this argument works with respect to risks and
persons. Suppose that people are willing to pay no more than $50 to
avoid a 1/100,000 risk of dying in a car crash, but that they are willing
to pay up to $100 to avoid a 1/100,000 risk of dying of cancer. If
government uses a WTP for both risks of $75, it will force people to
145. I am putting to one side the possibility that WTP and hence VSL reflect competition
for better relative position; if so, the VSL numbers, based on market evidence, are too low. See
Frank & Sunstein, supra note 62, at 363 (finding that the failure to take into account concerns of
relative position tends to underestimate risk-reduction benefits). A brief example: Suppose that
workers are willing to pay only $250 annually to eliminate a 1/10,000 risk; suppose too that
worker well-being depends, in large part, on relative income, not absolute income; and suppose
finally that workers would be willing to pay more than $250 if all workers were simultaneously
making the same payment, because in that event, relative position would not be compromised.
Under these assumptions, the WTP numbers, based on market evidence or contingent valuation
studies, underestimate VSL by a significant amount. See id. (estimating that the failure to take
relative position into account could lead to undervaluing VSL by roughly 75 percent).
146. See supra text accompanying note 61.
147. See DWORKIN, supra note 61, at 449 ("[Olne person-the person whose life it is-has a
special responsibility for each life, and [by] virtue of that special responsibility he or she has a
right to make the fundamental decisions that define, for him, what a successful life would be.").
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pay more than they want to avoid the risks associated with car
crashes, and less than they want to avoid risks of cancer. Why should
government do that? And if the argument is convincing in this
example, it should apply in numerous cases in which WTP and hence
VSL vary across risks.
With respect to persons, the argument is more controversial,
above all because it treats poor people as less valuable (literally) than
rich people. But at least at first glance, differences are appropriate
here as well. The reason is not that poor people are less valuable than
rich people. It is that no one, rich or poor, should be forced to pay
more than he is willing to pay for the reduction of risks. This idea
embodies a norm of equality. And if poor people are unwilling to pay
much for the reduction of serious risks, the appropriate response is
not a compelled purchase, but a subsidy. Suppose, for example, that
each member of a group of relatively poor people, earning less than
$30,000 annually, is willing to pay only $25 to eliminate a risk of
1/100,000-about one-half, suppose, of the nation's population-wide
median of $50. Should regulators require every citizen, including
those in the relatively poor group, to pay $50? Government should
not force poor people to pay more than their WTP to eliminate
statistical risks; forced exchanges of this kind do poor people no good
and some harm.
It is tempting to justify a uniform VSL, one that does not
distinguish between rich and poor, on the ground that it embodies a
form of risk equity, treating every person as equal to every other
person 1" and redistributing resources in the direction of poor people.
But this is an error. A uniform VSL, taken from a population-wide
median, does not produce redistribution toward the poor, any more
than any other kind of forced exchange. Government does not
require people to buy Volvos, even though Volvos would reduce
statistical risks. If government required everyone to buy Volvos, it
would not be producing desirable redistribution. 9 A uniform VSL
148. See ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 9, at 72 (arguing that varying VSL based
on potential earnings is "difficult to reconcile with ideals of democracy and equal treatment
under the law, let alone the sacredness of every human being").
149. Of course it is sometimes desirable for government to create "safety floors," for
automobiles and other consumer goods, in part as a response to an absence of adequate
information in the market. But such floors should not be seen as a redistributive tool, because
they are not likely to produce good redistribution. Cf Susan Rose-Ackerman, Comment,
Progressive Law and Economics-And the New Administrative Law, 98 YALE L.J. 341, 354
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has some of the same characteristics as a policy that requires people
to buy Volvos. In principle, the government should force exchanges
only on terms that people find acceptable, at least if it is genuinely
concerned with their welfare.
Note, once again, that the argument for using WTP does not
imply satisfaction with the existing distribution of wealth. The
problem with forced exchanges is that they do nothing to alter
existing distributions. In fact they make poor people worse off,
requiring them to use their limited resources for something that they
do not want to buy.
Does the easy case seem implausibly unrealistic? In many
contexts, it certainly is. The costs of air pollution regulation, for
example, are not fully borne by its beneficiaries."' But for workers'
compensation regulation, for example, the situation is very different:
with the enactment of workers' compensation programs,
nonunionized workers faced a dollar-for-dollar wage reduction,
corresponding almost perfectly to the expected value of the benefits
that they received.' For drinking water regulation, something similar
is involved. The cost of regulation is passed onto consumers in the
form of higher water bills. "2 Hence the easy case finds a number of
real-world analogues.
2. Objections. There are several possible objections to the use
of WTP to calculate VSL. They point to some important
qualifications, but none of them is a convincing refutation of the
straightforward argument.
a. Adaptive Preferences and "Miswanting." The first objection
emphasizes the possibility that people's preferences have adapted to
existing opportunities, including deprivation.'53 Perhaps people show a
(1988) (arguing that occupational health and safety regulations are not an effective method of
redistribution).
150. Matthew E. Kahn, The Beneficiaries of Clean Air Act Regulation, REGULATION, Spring
2001, at 34, 35-38.
151. PRICE V. FISHBACK & SHAWN EVERETT KANTOR, A PRELUDE TO THE WELFARE
STATE 69, app. D at 231-38 (2000).
152. See Sunstein, supra note 54, at 2271 (noting that a particular proposal to increase
drinking water quality would have resulted in an annual increase of $30 in the water bills for
most households).
153. See JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES 109-10 (1983) (defining "adaptive preferences" as
what happens when "people tend to adjust their aspirations to their possibilities"); Adler &
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low WTP for environmental goods, including health improvements,
simply because they have adjusted to environmental bads, including
health risks. Perhaps people's WTP reflects an effort to reduce
cognitive dissonance through the conclusion that risks are lower than
they actually are.5 To generalize, perhaps people suffer from a
problem of "miswanting";... they want things that do not promote
their welfare, and they do not want things that would promote their
welfare. If this is so, then WTP loses much of its underlying
justification; people's decisions do not actually promote their
welfare,"6 and their autonomy, properly understood, may not require
respect for their decisions, which may be nonautonomous. If
government can be confident that people are not willing to pay for
goods from which they would greatly benefit, perhaps government
should abandon WIP.
In some contexts, this objection raises serious problems for
neoclassical economics and for unambivalent enthusiasm for freedom
of choice.'57 Autonomy is implicated in addition to welfare. Suppose
that people do not want risk reduction because they believe risk to be
inevitable, or because their preferences have adapted to dangerous
and unfair conditions. If so, people's preferences do not reflect their
autonomy. In other words, the idea of autonomy requires not merely
Posner, supra note 5, at 1128-30 (hypothesizing, for example, that "people are not willing to pay
for parks because they have adapted to a world without parks").
154. See generally GEORGE A. AKERLOF & WILLIAM T. DICKENS, The Economic
Consequences of Cognitive Dissonance, in AN ECONOMIC THEORIST'S BOOK OF TALES 123
(1984) (analyzing the incorporation of the psychological theory of cognitive dissonance into
economic models).
155. For an analysis and explanation of the idea of "miswanting," see Daniel T. Gilbert &
Timothy D. Wilson, Miswanting, in FEELING AND THINKING: THE ROLE OF AFFECr IN SOCIAL
COGNITION 178, 179 (Joseph P. Forgas ed., 2000), who explain that:
Although we tend to think of unhappiness as something that happens to us when we
do not get what we want, much unhappiness... has less to do with not getting what
we want, and more to do with not wanting what we like. When wanting and liking are
uncoordinated in this way we may say that person has miswanted.
Id. See generally Timothy D. Wilson & Daniel T. Gilbert, Affective Forecasting, in 35
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 345 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 2003) (analyzing
people's ability to accurately predict their own feelings).
156. For a discussion on how preferences influence judgments, see Daniel Kahneman et al.,
Back to Bentham? Explorations of Experienced Utility, 112 Q.J. ECON. 375, 379-88 (1997)
(arguing that utility's impact on human behavior can be understood better and researched more
effectively by analyzing the normative idea of "total utility" as the discrete concepts of
"experienced utility" and "decisional utility").
157. See supra note 156; George Lowenstein & David Schkade, Wouldn't It Be Nice?:
Predicting Future Feelings, in WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY 85
(Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1999).
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respect for whatever preferences people happen to have, but also
social conditions that allow preferences to be developed in a way that
does not reflect coercion or injustice. With respect to some risks, the
relevant preferences are nonautonomous; consider the fact that many
women face a risk of male violence under circumstances in which they
believe that little can be done and hence adapt.
In the context of ordinary regulatory policy, however, this
objection has more theoretical than practical interest. Typically
regulation involves the reduction of low-level mortality risks (say,
1/50,000). Much of the time, there is no reason to believe that the use
of informed WTP (say, $100) is a product of adaptive preferences.
When people's WTP does appear to result from adaptive preferences,
however, the judgment about the easy cases must be revised.
b. Inadequate Information and Bounded Rationality. A closely
related objection would point to an absence of information and to
bounded rationality. As I have stressed throughout, people have
difficulty dealing with low-probability events.5 If people are not
aware of what they might be gaining by regulation, their WTP can be
too low. Perhaps the availability heuristic will lead people to
underestimate the risk. If people cannot recall a case in which some
activity produced illness or death, they may conclude that the risk is
trivial even if it is not. Or perhaps the same heuristic, and probability
neglect, will lead people to exaggerate risks, producing a WTP that is
wildly inflated in light of reality. And if people are unable to
understand the meaning of ideas like "one in fifty thousand," or to
respond rationally to such ideas, then there are serious problems with
relying on WTP.
It is also possible that people's WTP reflects excessive
discounting of future health benefits. If workers are ignoring the
future, or applying an implausibly high discount rate, then there is a
good argument for setting aside their WTP. In the context of global
warming, for example, the temporally distant nature of the harm
might well lead to insufficient concern for a potentially catastrophic
risk. The same is true for less dramatic risks that people face in their
daily lives. Young smokers, for example, probably give too little
attention to the health harms caused by smoking. Those who choose a
158. See, e.g., Jolls et aL., supra note 131, at 1519 ("People sometimes... underestimate the
likelihood of low-probability or low-salience events because these threats simply do not make it
onto people's 'radar screens."').
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poor diet and little exercise almost certainly fail to consider the long-
term effects of their behavior. Self-control problems are an important
part of bounded rationality. If a low WTP shows a failure to give
adequate attention to the future, then there is reason not to use WTP.
In many cases, however, WTP is a result of adequate information
and bounded rationality is not leading people to err. If so,
appropriate adjustments should be made to WTP, and the VSL that
emerges from WTP should be corrected.
c. Rights. A quite different objection would point to people's
rights. Perhaps people have a right not to be subjected to risks of a
certain magnitude, and the use of WTP will violate this right. It seems
fully reasonable to say that whatever their WTP, human beings
should have a right not to be subject to risks above a particular level.
Imagine, for example, that poor people live in a place where they face
a 1/20 annual risk of dying from water pollution; it makes sense to say
that the government should reduce that risk even if people are willing
to pay only $1 to eliminate it and the per-person cost is $100.'59
As an abstract claim about people's rights, the objection is
entirely correct. Something has gone badly wrong if people are
exposed to serious risks and their WTP prevents them, and is invoked
to prevent their government, from doing anything in response. It
would be foolish to suggest that WTP is determinative of the
appropriate use of government subsidies; a redistributive policy does
not track people's WTP. (Would it make sense to say that
government would give poor people a check for $100 only if they
were willing to pay $100 for the check?) And in many cases people
are subject to risks whose magnitude is indeed a violation of rights.
But this point has little force against the particular argument that I
am making.
The initial problem with this objection is that in the cases under
discussion, rights of this kind are usually not involved; I am speaking
here of statistically small risks. Suppose that this initial response is
unconvincing and that rights are indeed involved. If so, there is a still
more fundamental response. When rights are involved, the proper
response is not to force people to buy protection that they do not
want, but to provide a subsidy that will give them the benefit for free
or enable them to receive the benefit at what is, for them, an
159. I bracket the possibility that rights are resource-dependent, and I simply assume here
that risks above a certain level should count as violative of rights.
[Vol. 54:385428
HeinOnline  -- 54 Duke L.J. 428 2004-2005
VALUING LIFE
acceptable price.6° Nothing here is meant to deny the possibility that
government should provide certain goods via subsidy, or indeed that
subjection to risks above a certain level is a violation of rights."' The
question instead is one of regulation under the stated assumptions. So
long as that is the question, use of WTP does not violate anyone's
rights.
d. Democracy versus Markets. An independent objection would
stress that people are citizens, not merely consumers; it would urge
that regulatory choices be made after citizens have deliberated with
one another about their preferences and values.162 The argument
against forced exchanges treats people as consumers; it sees their
decisions about safety as the same as their decisions about all other
commodities.'63  For some decisions, this approach is badly
misconceived." Our constitutional system is a deliberative
democracy,"' not a maximization machine, and many social
judgments should be made by citizens engaged in deliberative
discussion with one another rather than by aggregating the individual
choices of consumers. 166
Consider some examples:
0 In the context of race and sex discrimination, sensible
societies do not aggregate people's WTP. The level of
160. I put to one side the question of whether people should be given in-kind benefits or
instead lump sums.
161. There is a separate question, not addressed here, whether and when subjection to risks
of harm (as opposed to actual harm) is itself a harm. See Matthew D. Adler, Risk, Death and
Harm: The Normative Foundations of Risk Regulation, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1293, 1340-88 (2003)
(reviewing arguments supporting and refuting the proposition that the risk of death is itself a
harm that affects welfare).
162. See AMARTYA SEN, RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM 287 (2002) (noting that "discussions
and exchange, and even political arguments, contribute to the formulation and revision of
values").
163. See Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social
Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV, 2121, 2176 (1990)
("In the highly differentiated world of the modem liberal state, the same person may have distinct
interests in her role as consumer from those in her role as worker, or as citizen, or as a parent, or as
member of a religious community."); see generally ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS
AND ECONOMICS (1993).
164. Pildes & Anderson, supra note 163, at 2176 ("Individuals are better understood as
approaching many choices not from a unitary, fixed perspective, but from several different perspectives
that pull them in different directions.").
165. See generally JOSEPH M. BESSETTE, THE MILD VOICE OF REASON: DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY AND AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT (1994).
166. See the discussion of "government by discussion" in SEN, supra note 162, at 287-89.
2004]
HeinOnline  -- 54 Duke L.J. 429 2004-2005
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
permissible discrimination is not set by using market
evidence or contingent valuation studies to see how much
people would be willing to pay to discriminate (or to be free
from discrimination). Even if discriminators would be willing
to pay a lot to avoid associating with members of unpopular
groups, such discrimination is banned. Through political
processes, citizens have decided that certain forms of
discrimination are illicit, whatever people's WTP.
* The prohibition against sexual harassment does not emerge
from a governmental WTP. Many harassers would be willing
to pay something, perhaps a great deal, for the privilege of
harassing; in imaginable circumstances, the harassers' WTP
might exceed their victims' WTP to prevent harassment.
Nonetheless, harassment is forbidden, and WTP is irrelevant.
* The protection of endangered species is not chosen on the
basis of aggregated WTP. Whether and when to protect
members of endangered species is a moral question to be
resolved through democratic discussion, not through
exercises in consumer sovereignty. Some people may be
willing to pay a significant amount to harm endangered
species, at least if that harm is necessary to undertake
development activities. Their WTP is not taken to be part of
the legal assessment of what they are permitted to do.
• Laws that forbid cruelty to animals, and that impose
affirmative duties of protection on human beings, stem not
from WTP, but from a belief that moral commitments call for
such laws. When laws require that animals be protected
against suffering, it does not matter that those who are
regulated (university laboratories, for example) may be
willing to pay a significant amount to avoid the regulation. Of
course the cost of the regulatory burden might play a role in
deciding whether to impose it. But the underlying moral
judgment is rooted in a belief in the avoidance of suffering
that does not essentially turn on WTP.
Emphasizing the limits of any approach that takes "preferences"
to be the foundation of regulatory policy, Professor Amartya Sen
stresses that "discussions and exchange, and even political arguments,
contribute to the formation and revision of values."'67 He urges that in
167. Id. at 287.
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the particular context of environmental protection, solutions require
regulators "to go beyond looking only for the best reflection of given
individual preferences, or the most acceptable procedures for choices
based on those preferences. ' '6
Professor Sen's claims are both fundamental and correct. They
point to some serious limitations on the use of WTP. But it is
important not to read such objections for more than they are worth.
In trading off safety and health in their private lives, people do not
have static values and preferences. Much of the time, human choices
are a product of reflection, even if choosers are simply acting as
consumers. Reflection and deliberation, including reflection and
deliberation with other people, are hardly absent from the market
domain. To be sure, moral questions should not be resolved by
aggregating private WTP. Sometimes people's preferences, even
though backed by WTP, are morally off-limits, and policy should not
take account of them. In addition, people are sometimes unwilling to
pay a great deal for goods that have strong moral justifications;
animal welfare is an example. In these circumstances, the market
model is inapplicable and WTP reveals very little.
But what about the easy case? Do these arguments suggest that
government should override individual choices about how much to
spend to eliminate low-level risks, even when those choices are
adequately informed? For environmental protection generally, it is
indeed important to go beyond "the best reflection of given individual
preferences.' ' 169 But this point does not mean that people should be
required to pay $100 to eliminate mortality risks of 1/100,000 when
they are willing to pay only $75. If people's WTP reflects an absence
of information or insufficient deliberation, then it is important for
other people, in government and elsewhere, to draw attention to that
fact. And in some cases, a low WTP might be overridden on the
ground that it is rooted in errors, factual or otherwise. But these
points should not be taken as a general objection to my conclusion
about the easy case, or to suggest that government should force
people to reduce statistical risks at an expense that they deem
excessive.
Here is one way to understand the argument that I am making:
The American system is a deliberative democracy, to be sure, but in
168. Id. at 289 (emphasis omitted).
169. Id. (emphasis omitted).
20041
HeinOnline  -- 54 Duke L.J. 431 2004-2005
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
this democracy, it is valuable for regulators to consider more fully
individuated VSLs in deciding how to proceed, at least under the
stated assumptions.
e. Very Low Probabilities and Catastrophic Risks. Suppose that
everyone in the United States faces an annual death risk of
1/10,000,000-and that this risk, if it comes to fruition, will kill every
person in the country. The expected number of annual deaths is
twenty-six, ' which would produce expected annual costs in excess of
$158 million, assuming a VSL of $6.1 million. But if the government
attempted to elicit each individual's WTP to avoid a risk of
1/10,000,000, it might well produce a number very close to zero. How
much would you be willing to spend to avoid a risk of 1/10,000,000? If
you say "nothing," you might well be like most people. And if most
people really are like that, the supposed risk of 1/10,000,000,
applicable to everyone in the United States, yields both twenty-six
expected annual fatalities and expected annual costs very close to
zero-an especially odd result in light of the fact that there is a
1/10,000,000 risk not simply that each American will die, but that
every American will die.'71
This result does seem anomalous. For one thing, is it really
sensible to conclude that the prevention of twenty-six deaths is worth
nothing, or close to it? An affirmative answer is suggested by a
perspective that is fully based on people's WTP to avoid very low
probability risks. But assigning a value near zero, for the prevention
of dozens of deaths, seems quite implausible. In cases of this kind,
there is a serious problem with using WTP to calculate the benefit of
avoiding that risk.
This conclusion actually understates the problem. In the case at
hand, the risk is potentially catastrophic. As I have said, if the
1/10,000,000 chance is realized, every American will be dead. Even if
people show a WTP near zero to avoid a risk of that size, it does not
seem right to think that the nation should spend almost nothing to
prevent it."2 The point has a general bearing on precautions against
low probability risks of catastrophe: some degree of prevention
170. Assuming a U.S. population of 260 million.
171. For a valuable discussion, see generally POSNER, supra note 78. See also Cass R.
Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic, CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2006).
172. See id. at 168-69 ("[If the minute risk is of a 'dreadful' catastrophe, [people] may
demand a very high price to bear it, however slight it is, in which event the value of life implied
by their behavior may be astronomical.").
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should be undertaken even if WTP numbers do not justify it. Part of
the problem with those numbers is that individual behavior will not
reflect the "catastrophe premium" or "extermination premium" that
would almost certainly emerge if it were possible to test for it. People
may be unwilling to pay anything to avoid a risk of 1/100,000,000 that
they themselves face; but if they were told that every person in the
nation faced this risk, they might come up with a significantly higher
figure. It would take the right question to produce the higher
numbers. Another the problem is that WTP is not an adequate
measure of social responses to catastrophes-in part because people
are not familiar with making choices about risks of that sort.
In my view, this is a sound objection to the use of a low or near-
zero VSL in the context of catastrophic risks, even if the WTP
calculation would produce that VSL. As Judge Richard Posner
shows,173 this is an important point when government is considering
how to respond to small risks of catastrophic harm. But notice that
the objection has built-in limitations. It does not apply to the
overwhelming number of cases in which VSL is used. In those cases,
the risks in question are 1/10,000 to 1/100,000, and no large-scale
catastrophe is at issue. Here, then, is a limitation on the use of WTP,
but the domain of the objection is restricted.
f Third-Party Effects. A final objection would point to effects
on third parties. If outsiders would be adversely affected by the
undervaluing of a particular risk, and if their welfare is not being
considered, then the WTP calculus is seriously incomplete. This point
demonstrates a general and badly neglected problem for WTP as it is
currently used: agencies consider people's WTP to eliminate
statistical risks, without taking account of the fact that others-
especially family members and close friends-would also be willing to
pay something to eliminate those risks. John might be willing to pay
$25 to eliminate his own risk of 1/100,000, but his wife, Jane, might be
willing to pay $25 to eliminate John's risk also. If regulators add the
WTP, on John's behalf, of John's friends and relatives, the total WTP
might soon exceed $100. This is a real problem for existing uses of
WTP.
But thus far the discussion has been assuming that there are no
third-party effects. The argument for using WTP, on the stated
assumptions, is that government should not force people to buy goods
173. See id. at 196-98.
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that are not worthwhile for them. At least at first glance, this
argument seems sound with respect to statistical risks of the kind on
which I am focusing.
B. Harder Cases: Autonomy, Kaldor-Hicks, and Welfare
There is an obvious artificiality in the assumptions thus far. Most
important, people do not always bear the full social costs of the
regulatory benefits that they receive. Sometimes they pay only a
fraction of those costs-or possibly nothing at all. When this is so, the
normative analysis is much more complicated. In the context of air
pollution regulation, for example, there is a complex set of
distributional effects, and on balance, poor people, and members of
minority communities, appear to be net gainers.'75 An efficiency
analysis, based on WTP, might not produce an adequate account of
the welfare effects of air pollution regulation. And even if it did, an
account of welfare effects might not resolve the normative question,
because the distributional gains are important to consider.' The
difficulty is that a high VSL, one that exceeds what WTP studies show
for poor people, may produce outcomes that are in the best interest
of poor people, in the sense that the result is a welfare improvement
for them.'7" And if poor people do not bear all of the costs of
174. Note that the argument would not apply to risks faced by nonhuman animals; in that
event, people's WTP could not tell the whole story.
175. See Kahn, supra note 150, at 37-38 (analyzing pollution and demographic data from
California and finding that, under the Clean Air Act, "poorer, less educated populations have
experienced a greater overall improvement in air quality between 1980 and 1998").
176. The Office of Management and Budget has expressly recognized this point in its most
recent guidelines governing regulatory impact analysis. See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Draft
2003 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations, 68 Fed. Reg. 5492,
5517 (Feb. 3, 2003):
Those who bear the costs of a regulation and those who enjoy its benefits often are
not the same people. . . .Your regulatory analysis should provide a separate
description of distributional effects (i.e., how both benefits and costs are distributed
among sub-populations of particular concern) so that decisionmakers can properly
consider them along with the effects on economic efficiency.
177. For relevant discussion, see Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L.
REv. 223, 227-28, 255-61 (2000). Professor Jolls argues that accommodation mandates might
produce desired redistributive gains whether or not they are efficient, and she supplies a
detailed analysis of when those gains are most likely to occur. See id. at 250 ("Even if the value
of the accommodation is less than its cost, the mandate may make disadvantaged workers better
off because nondisadvantaged workers will bear some of the associated cost."). At present,
there is no parallel discussion for regulation of the sort that I am discussing here. My suggestion
is that under imaginable assumptions, some regulation will be defensible on distributive
grounds.
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programs that benefit them, the autonomy argument for WTP is
greatly reduced; they are enjoying a benefit (partly) for free, and it
does not insult anyone's autonomy to give them a good on terms that
they find acceptable. Note that these points do not bear directly on
the question of whether VSL should vary across risks. But they do
bear on the issue of varying VSL across persons, and in particular
across disparities in income and wealth.
Suppose, for example, that beneficiaries of a proposed drinking
water regulation are willing to pay only $80 to eliminate a risk of
1/50,000. Assume, in addition, that the per-person cost of eliminating
a 1/50,000 risk is $100-but that for every dollar of that cost, the
beneficiaries pay only $.80. The remaining $.20 might be paid by
water companies themselves, in the form of reduced profits, or by
employees of the water companies, in the form of reduced wages and
fewer jobs. In this example, the costs of the regulation exceed the
benefits: it is inefficient. But by hypothesis, the regulation makes its
beneficiaries better off. If the WTP criterion is used, the fact that the
monetized costs exceed the monetized benefits is decisive. But as a
normative matter, the analysis here is far harder than in the easy
cases. On what assumption should the WTP numbers be decisive?
The assumption must be that economic efficiency is the goal of
government, at least in the context of regulation-that to know what
to do, government should aggregate the benefits and costs of
regulation, and act if and only if the benefits exceed the costs. When
using the WTP numbers, government is acting as a maximization
machine, aggregating all benefits and costs as measured by the WTP
criterion. But this is a highly contestable understanding of what
government should be doing. In fact it represents a shift from the
relatively uncontroversial Pareto criterion, exemplified above, to a
version of the far more controversial Kaldor-Hicks criterion,' s which
assesses policy by asking this question: Are the gainers winning more
than the losers are losing? The Kaldor-Hicks criterion is sometimes
described as potential Pareto superiority,'79 because it asks whether in
principle, the winners could compensate the losers, and a surplus
178. It is only a version of that criterion, because it is measuring welfare in monetary
equivalents. A direct assessment of welfare, if it were possible, might justify the regulation in
question on Kaldor-Hicks grounds.
179. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 13 (6th ed. 2003) ("The
Kaldor-Hicks concept is also and suggestively called potential Pareto superiority: The winners
could compensate the losers, whether or not they actually do.").
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could be left over. The difficulty of course is that Pareto superiority is
merely potential. Some people really are losing and others are
gaining.
In these harder cases, the gainers are gaining less (in monetary
terms) than the losers are losing-and hence the regulation is said to
be unjustified. Under the assumptions that I have given, the
regulation is indeed inefficient: its social cost is higher than its social
benefit. But is the regulation undesirable? This is not at all clear. The
first problem is that WTP is measuring gains and losses in monetary
terms, rather than in welfare terms.8' It is possible that those who
gain, in the harder cases, gain more welfare than the losers lose; WTP
is not dispositive on that question. The second problem is
distributional. Suppose that in terms of overall welfare, the regulation
is not desirable; it makes aggregate welfare lower rather than higher.
But suppose too that those who benefit are less advantaged than
those who lose. If, for example, those who are willing to pay $80 are
disproportionately poor, and those who pay the remainder are
disproportionately wealthy, the regulation might plausibly be justified
despite the welfare loss.
It is natural to respond here that, if redistribution is the goal,
then it should be produced not through regulation but through the tax
system, which is a more efficient way of transferring resources to
people who need help.181 I agree. But suppose that redistribution is
not possible through the tax system. If so, then regulation in the
harder cases cannot be ruled off-limits despite its inefficiency. The
fact that a regulation is helpful to the most disadvantaged is not
decisive in its favor. If it is trivially helpful, and if it inflicts huge costs
on everyone else, little can be said for it. But everything depends on
the magnitude of the relevant effects. A program that produced large
gains for the least well-off would seem to be justified even if it
imposed, in terms of WTP, slightly higher costs than benefits on
balance.
180. On the direct measurement of welfare, see generally Kahneman et al., supra note 156
(exploring various methods of measuring the utility of temporally extended outcomes).
181. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient Than
the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 667 (1994) ("[R]edistribution
through legal rules offers no advantage over redistribution through the income tax system and
typically is less efficient."); Steven Shavell, A Note on Efficiency vs. Distributional Equity in
Legal Rulemaking: Should Distributional Equity Matter Given Optimal Income Taxation?, 71
AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 414, 414 (1981) (describing how an income tax can
compensate for inefficient liability rules and redistribute income); David A. Weisbach, Should
[Vol. 54:385
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C. Harder Cases as Easy Ones, and VSL Again
Is there a reason to treat the harder cases as identical to the easy
ones? Is this absurd? 112 Agencies do not distinguish between them,
although recent guidelines, encouraging agency attention to
distributional issues, might eventually persuade them to do so.1"3 A
possible reason for treating the harder cases the same as the easy ones
is the existence of an optimal income tax. If the tax system produced
the right level of redistribution, there would be good reason for
agencies to rely on individualized VSL and not to concern themselves
with whether the beneficiaries of regulation were paying for any or all
of the costs. The hard cases would be treated as the easy ones. For
people who believe that the hard cases must be treated differently, it
is because further redistribution is desirable.
Another reason for treating the harder cases as the easy ones
would be optimism: perhaps everything will balance out in the end.
Perhaps no group will be systematically helped or hurt, and the tax
system will produce appropriate redistribution. In the real-world
cases, regulators might also think that a direct inquiry into welfare,
bypassing WTP, would be extremely difficult or perhaps even
impossible to operationalize. If distributional considerations are
relevant, interest-group warfare may be the consequence, rather than
distribution to those who particularly need and deserve help.1" More
modestly, it might be concluded that agencies should generally pursue
efficiency, using WTP as the foundation for decisions, but should
allow distributional findings to cut the other way in cases in which
there is compelling reason to do so. In fact this approach is a plausible
Legal Rules Be Used to Redistribute Income?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 439 (2003) ("[Tjhe tax
system is a better tool for redistribution of income than legal rules.").
182. See John Broome, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Population, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 953, 958
(2000) (urging that "there are separate reasons why preferences are an unsatisfactory basis for
valuing lives," including that, "in contexts involving risks, people's preferences are generally
muddled and incoherent" rather than rational). If preferences are in fact muddled and
incoherent, current practice is of course on thin ground.
183. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4, REGULATORY ANALYSIS, at 4
(Sept. 17, 2003) (noting that "possible justifications [for regulation] include.., removing
distributional unfairness"), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/aOO4/a-4.pdf.
184. See, e.g., Viscusi, supra note 10, at 844-45 (describing, as an example of interest-group
warfare, how an affluent suburban neighborhood successfully thwarted the development of a
nearby landfill, resulting in the landfill's being moved to a "pristine research forest and nature
preserve" belonging to Duke University because the university was located in a neighboring
county and thus possessed less political clout than the suburban neighborhood).
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way of reading the Office of Management and Budget's current
guidelines on regulatory impact analysis."'
In the easy cases, the resulting redistribution is almost certainly
perverse, because forced exchanges, under the stated assumptions,
are highly likely to harm the people who are being coerced. But in the
harder cases, it cannot be said that the beneficiaries of regulation will
be harmed if government uses a number that exceeds their actual
VSLs. Everything depends on the distributional effects of the
regulation. If the beneficiaries are well-off, a high VSL might produce
perverse redistribution if those who lose are toward the bottom of the
economic ladder. It is possible to envision this result, for example,
with a pollution program that protects those who visit expensive
recreational areas. In contrast, if the beneficiaries are poor, and if the
costs are borne by the wealthy or by the general population, a high
VSL might be in the interest of those who need help. Air pollution
programs, providing special protection for people in cities, appear to
be an example. 186 It is therefore reasonable to reject the confident
view of economically inclined analysts who believe that accurate
VSLs, based on actual WTP (and hence individuated), should always
be the basis of regulatory policy. But it is similarly reasonable to
reject the confident view of skeptics who believe that a uniform VSL,
refusing to make distinctions among persons, is best on distributive
grounds.
What are the implications for individuation of VSL? It remains
true that according to the theory that underlies agency valuations, a
higher degree of individuation would be desirable. It also remains
true that with respect to risks, individuation is appropriate insofar as
valuations differ depending on the nature of the risk at stake. The
principal qualification is that a uniform VSL, one that gives
disadvantaged people regulatory protection in excess of their WTP,
might turn out to have fortunate distributional consequences in the
harder cases. Regulators should be careful about this point. It will not
185. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 183, at 5:
There are justifications for regulations in addition to correcting market failures. A
regulation may be appropriate when you have a clearly identified measure that can
make government operate more efficiently. In addition, Congress establishes some
regulatory programs to redistribute resources to select groups. Such regulations
should be examined to ensure that they are both effective and cost-effective.
186. See Kahn, supra note 150, at 38 & tbl.3 (finding that "residents of the Los Angeles
basin, where regulation is especially stringent, experienced a larger pollution exposure
reduction than [other] California residents").
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always hold, and if the goal is to provide more assistance to those in
need, a uniform VSL is hardly the best way to achieve that goal.
Consider the case of poor areas of the country: a national VSL of $6.1
million would almost certainly be harmful, simply because the
resulting levels of regulation would have adverse effects on wages and
employment levels. My only point is that in some cases, individuation
across persons will produce worse outcomes on distributional grounds
and possibly on grounds of welfare as well.
IV. GLOBAL RISK REGULATION AND CROSS-NATIONAL
VALUATIONS
The analysis thus far has significant implications for global risk
regulation and cross-cultural variations in WTP and VSL. In this Part,
I turn to those implications. My conclusion is that poor countries
should use a lower VSL than wealthy countries, and that people in
poor countries are not helped if the United States, or an international
body, insists on a high one. But the analysis must be different if the
question is the behavior of donors or donor nations. Nations who are
most in need deserve help, even if their WTP is low. For purposes of
regulation, however, insistence on a high VSL will not provide that
help. I begin with the distinction between donor practices and
government regulation and then turn to the practical question of
cross-national valuations.
A. Are Indian Lives Worth Less Than American Lives?
I have suggested that people in poor nations show a lower WTP
and hence VSL than people in wealthy nations. ' 8 Because poor
people have less money than rich people, this finding should not be at
all surprising. Building on evidence of this kind, some assessments of
the effects of global warming find far higher monetized costs from
deaths of people in rich countries than from deaths of people in poor
countries."8 These assessments have been highly controversial;
187. See supra Table 3.
188. See Kirsten Halsnaes et al., Case Studies for Zimbabwe, Botswana, Mauritius and Thailand, in
CLIMATE CHANGE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: PROSPECTS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 202,
206-07 (Anil Markandya. & Kirsten Halsnaes, eds., 2002) (calculating a VSL for the European Union
of $3.9 million in 1995 prices, compared to VSLs of $315,000 to $1.2 million for the four developing
countries in the case study); cf INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, THIRD
ASSESSMENT REPORT: CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: MITIGATION 483 (finding that "[t]he VSL is generally
lower in poor countries than in rich countries"), available at http://grida.no/climate/ipcc-tar/wg3.
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Professor John Broome, for example, notes that under one approach,
an American life is worth ten or twenty Indian lives, a judgment that
he deems "absurd., 189 As a result, some analysts, including the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, have opted for a
worldwide VSL of $1 million, a choice that seems quite arbitrary and
potentially harmful to people in rich and poor nations alike.
The issue raises important dilemmas. How should global
institutions assess the monetary value of human lives? What are the
monetized costs of ten thousand worldwide deaths from global
warming, deaths that include eight thousand people from poor
countries and two thousand from wealthy ones? The discussion thus
far suggests that there is no sensible abstract answer to these
questions; it is important to know what, in particular, the answer is
for. If a general question is asked, outside of any particular context,
about the monetary value of a stated number of deaths in 2020, it is
best left unanswered (except perhaps with laughter). The appropriate
assessments of VSL, and variations across countries, depend on their
intended use. If disparate numbers are meant to identify the actual
monetary values of human lives, and to suggest that people in Canada
are "worth" much more than people in Argentina or that poor people
are "worth" less than rich ones, the numbers are ludicrous as well as
offensive.
It is possible to go further. If the disparate numbers are meant to
suggest the appropriate amount that donor institutions should spend
to reduce mortality risks, they make little sense. The fact that a poor
person in a poor nation would be willing to pay $1 to eliminate a risk
of 1/10,000, whereas a wealthy person in a wealthy nation would be
willing to pay $100, cannot plausibly be used to defend the view that
189. See Broome, supra note 182, at 957 (noting that this conclusion is a product of "a
money-metric utility function to represent a person's preferences," an approach that Professor
Broome rejects). In the easy cases, I suggest that a money-metric utility function is not absurd,
and it is not quite absurd in the hard cases either. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 188, at 483:
The VSL is generally lower in poor countries than in rich countries, but it is
considered unacceptable by many analysts to impose different values for a policy that
has to be international in scope and decided by the international community. In these
circumstances, analysts use average VSL and apply it to all countries. Of course, such
a value is not what individuals would pay for the reduction in risk, but it is an "equity
adjusted" value, in which greater weight is given to the WTP of lower income groups.
On the basis of EU and US VSLs and a weighting system that has some broad appeal
in terms of government policies towards income distribution, Eyre et al. (1998)
estimate the average world VSL at around 1 million Euros (approximately US$1
million at 1999 exchange rates).
[Vol. 54:385440
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an international agency should devote its resources to the latter
rather than the former. To illustrate this point, imagine choosing
between two programs:
(A) Program A would eliminate (at a stated cost of $500) a
1/10,000 risk faced by fifty poor people in Costa Rica, each
willing to pay $2 to eliminate that risk.
(B) Program B would eliminate (also at a stated cost of $500) a
1/10,000 risk faced by fifty wealthy people in Germany,
each willing to pay $350 to eliminate that same risk.
In principle, there is no reason to think that a donor should
prefer to save the Germans, even though their WTP is far higher than
that of the Costa Ricans. In fact, Program A has much higher priority,
because it would help people who were facing extreme deprivation.
What is true at the individual level is true across nations as well.
But now consider a different issue. The government in a poor
nation is deciding on appropriate policy to reduce workplace risks;
what VSL should it use? At least under the assumptions that I have
given thus far, such a government would do well to begin by using the
admittedly low WTP of its own citizens. If citizens in that nation show
a WTP of $2 to eliminate risks of 1/10,000, then their government
does them no favors by requiring them to pay $50 or $10 for that
protection. This is the sense in which VSL properly varies across
nations, and in which citizens of poor nations have lower VSLs than
citizens of wealthy ones.
The point has strong implications for international labor
standards. It is tempting to suggest that workers in poor countries, for
example China and India, should receive the same protection as those
in the United States; why should a worker in Beijing be subject to
significantly higher death risks than a worker in Los Angeles? So long
as the distribution of global income has the form that it does, a system
that gives Chinese workers the same protection as American workers
is not in the interest of Chinese workers-assuming, as I am, that the
cost of that protection is borne by workers themselves. Requiring
Chinese workers to have the same protection as Americans amounts
to a forced exchange on terms that Chinese workers reject.
In these circumstances it is unsurprising that workers in wealthy
nations, not in poor ones, often clamor the loudest for greater
protection of workers in poor nations; workers in wealthier nations
would be the principal beneficiaries of such regulation, which would
protect them against competition from those in poorer nations. The
2004]
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idea that workers in poor nations should have the "same" protection
as workers in wealthy nations is an error, rooted in a "moral
heuristic" involving the equal worth of all human lives-a heuristic
that sometimes works well but that also misfires.'90 The real question
is the effect of different numbers.
If the Chinese government uses a VSL of $6 million, on the
theory that its citizens should not be valued less than those of wealthy
nations, social harm will almost inevitably result. In the easy cases,
the forced exchanges will be ludicrously harmful to the people whom
they are supposed to help. In the hard cases, in which the
beneficiaries pay only a fraction of the cost (which is mostly borne by
others in the same nation), the nation will be spending far too much
of its money on risk reduction (or more precisely, on reducing the
risks that happen to get onto the regulatory agenda). The inefficiency
of an extremely high VSL will be felt acutely and in many forms,
including decreased employment. But if the costs of risk reduction
will be paid by third parties-for example, wealthy nations-then
people in the poor country will be helped even if risk reduction is
based on an excessive VSL.
Of course the citizens of poor nations would almost certainly be
helped more if they were given cash (supposing that it would not be
squandered) rather than in-kind benefits. But if cash redistribution is
not possible, regulatory benefits, provided for free or for a fraction of
their cost, remain a blessing. If, for example, a global institution uses
a worldwide VSL of $1 million, and if that amount exceeds the
domestic VSL of people in poor nations, it is possible that poor
people will gain a great deal if the resources for risk reduction are
provided by wealthy nations. In the harder cases, the simple point is
that many of the intended beneficiaries of regulation are in fact net
gainers.
B. Policy and Practice
How, then, should global institutions, such as the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, assess the monetary
costs of risks faced by people all over the world? As I have suggested,
the answer turns on the purpose of the assessment-on what issue the
answer is supposed to address. There is no good acontextual way of
190. On moral heuristics, see generally Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Heuristics and Moral
Framing, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1556 (2004).
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asking some question about the aggregate costs of global climate
change by 2050, unless it has some particular point. A far more
sensible question is whether it would make sense for any particular
nation to accept a particular way of responding to the problem of
climate change, such as the Kyoto Protocol. t At the national level,
an assessment of the costs and benefits of the Kyoto Protocol is not
much different from an assessment of the costs and benefits of any
other regulation.
For the United States, the likely costs of the Kyoto Protocol
greatly exceed its likely benefits. The anticipated costs are $325
billion,192 an amount that might be worthwhile if the anticipated
benefits for the United States were in the ballpark of that number.
But the overall benefits of the Kyoto Protocol are small because the
mandatory emissions reduction would make only a slight dent in
global warming.9 In the United States, the benefits could not
possibly justify the costs."9 The picture for the world as a whole is
more mixed, with Europe anticipated to be a net gainer.19 ' But even
for the world, the Kyoto Protocol appears to impose costs in excess of
benefits-and this is so even if improbable catastrophic risks are
taken into account. The only qualification here is that the science of
global warming is disputed; if this is a realm of uncertainty rather
than risk, and if worst-case scenarios are emphasized, then the Kyoto
Protocol might provide a sensible impetus toward technological
innovation and far more dramatic reductions.
For wealthy nations, of course, the argument for contributing to
the reduction of global warming is strengthened by the fact that the
harms of global warming will be felt disproportionately in poor
nations-and also by the fact that wealthy nations have done by far
the most to produce the situation that makes global warming a
serious problem. Hence it is reasonable to say that the United States
should join international agreements to combat global warming even
if it loses more than it gains. The problem with the Kyoto Protocol is
191. See WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS & JOSEPH BOYER, WARMING THE WORLD: ECONOMIC
MODELS OF GLOBAL WARMING 168 (2000) ("Finally, the Kyoto Protocol has significant
distributional consequences .... The lion's share of the[] costs are borne by the United States.
Indeed, the United States is a net loser while the rest of the world on balance benefits from the
Kyoto Protocol.").
192. Id. at 161.
193. Id. at 152.
194. Id. at 130-31 & tbl.7.4.
195. Id. at 162.
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that it combines extremely high global costs with relatively low global
benefits, even if the problem of global warming is taken quite
seriously. A sensible approach would control emissions in developing
countries, so as to increase the overall benefits, and also would use
emissions trading and other strategies to reduce the overall costs.
These routes could certainly produce sensible agreements to address
climate change.196 To the extent that emissions control in developing
countries would impose a significant burden, wealthy nations should
help to foot the bill.
But I am not attempting here to resolve any particular
controversy. My major suggestions are that within nations, diverse
VSLs are perfectly sensible, and that answers to questions about
valuation must be closely attuned to the purposes for which those
questions are being asked.
CONCLUSION
The theory that animates current valuations of mortality risks
argues in favor of far more individuation. Does the risk involve
cancer? What kind of cancer? Does it involve air pollution or driving
on the highways? If welfare and autonomy are the guides, it is obtuse
to adopt an approach that values all statistically equivalent mortality
risks in the same way. In addition, individuals display a great deal of
heterogeneity in their VSLs-not simply because of different tastes
and values, but also because of different levels of income and wealth.
WTP depends on ability to pay. Nothing that I have said here is
meant to suggest approval of existing distributions of resources.
Certainly poor people are not "worth less" than wealthy ones, and it
is often appropriate for government to provide resources directly to
poor people or subsidize the provision of regulatory benefits. But
forced exchanges are not a good way to assist poor people, and a
uniform VSL is often a perverse response to inequality. In theory,
risk-reduction policies should be more fully individuated, giving all
people regulatory protection that corresponds to their WTP for the
particular risk in question.
Of course this is not practicable. Government lacks the necessary
information about individual risk preferences; categorical judgments
are inevitable. In any case many of the benefits provided by
196. RICHARD B. STEWART & JONATHAN B. WIENER, RECONSTRUCTING CLIMATE
POLICY 38-40, 102-09 (2003).
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regulation are collective in character. Regulators cannot feasibly
provide protection to one person without simultaneously providing
protection to many. But it is nonetheless important to see what the
current theory counsels in principle, and to understand that the
limitations are practical ones, some of which may be overcome as
knowledge progresses. Even with the practical limitations, a uniform
VSL is increasingly difficult to justify.
It is clear that some risks produce a higher VSL than others,
resulting in significantly different analyses in many cases, above all by
producing a higher VSL for cancer risks. A program that protects
elderly people should produce a lower VSL than one that protects
younger people, and there is no ethical objection to variations on the
basis of age.1 7 If a program affects mostly wealthy people, a VSL
based on the population-wide median will be too low. It would follow
that the FAA should have a relatively high VSL, because people who
fly are wealthier than the population median-and when the EPA is
engaging in cost-benefit analysis for programs protecting poor people
from risks associated with hazardous waste sites, it should have a
relatively low VSL.
The principal qualification is that when the beneficiaries of
regulation do not pay all of its cost, a high VSL may actually be in
their interests. The easy cases, in which the beneficiaries are forced to
pay for regulatory benefits, are not the same as those in which
beneficiaries pay only a fraction of the cost. Nonetheless, current
practice treats such cases as identical, perhaps because of the great
difficulty in untangling the incidence of regulatory benefits and costs.
My goal has not been to resolve that difficulty, but to suggest that the
theory behind current practice justifies far more individuation of VSL
than regulators currently provide. However regulators deal with
distributional problems and the hardest cases, the use of a uniform
VSL is unacceptably obtuse.
197. See Aldy & Viscusi, supra note 15, at 24 ("[W]orkers ... in their early 60s have a VSL
. about 30-40 percent lower than the market average and between one-third and one-half the
size of the VSLs for prime-aged workers."); Sunstein, supra note 8, at 210 ("If thirty-year-olds
are willing to pay more (or less) to eliminate a statistical risk than sixty-year-olds, then the
difference should be reflected in cost-benefit analyses of regulatory proposals. ...
[P]olicymakers should use different values for old people and young people if and only if WTP
studies show such a disparity."). I am putting to one side the difficult questions raised by the
need to produce a VSL for children.
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